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INTRODUCTION
The manner in which the United States satisfies its energy needs
over the next quarter century will determine the relative health of the
country physically, 1 politically, 2 environmentally, 3 and economically. 4
By 2030, the nation will see a 36% rise in electricity consumption. 5
Already the largest energy consumption sector, 6 electric power sector
needs will outpace the transmission grid’s distribution capacity 7 and the
country’s ability to absorb the deleterious financial effects of fossil fuelbased energy. 8 Congress must respond.
Respiratory illness, cancer, neurological disorders, and birth defects
caused by fossil fuels cost the country billions of dollars a year. 9 These
billions of dollars, public health entitlements notwithstanding, represent
a mass siphoning of capital that would otherwise, in the form of
commerce or workforce participation, contribute to the domestic
1. See Conrad G. Schneider, Clean Air Task Force, Dirty Air, Dirty Power:
Mortality and Health Damage Due to Air Pollution from Power Plants 7-15, June 2004
(citing Abt Associates, Inc., infra note 8).
2. See Western Hemisphere Energy Security: Testimony Before Comm. on Int’l
Relations Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of Karen A.
Harbert, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy); U.S. Dep’t
of Energy, Energy Policy Act of 2005: Section 1837: National Security Review of
International Energy Requirement, 34-35 (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, National Security Review].
3. See Alan Nogee et al., Powerful Solutions: 7 Ways to Switch America to
Renewable Energy, at 4 (Jan. 1999).
4. See id. at 7.
5. See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2007: With Projections to
2030, at 138, DOE/EIA-0383(2007) (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Annual Energy Outlook
2007].
6. Energy Info. Admin., Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, DOE/EIA0035(2007/03), at 25 (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Monthly Energy Review: March 2007].
The electric power sector comprises sellers of electricity, namely utility companies and
independent power producers. Id. at 176. This is distinguished from so-called “enduse” sectors of the economy: residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation. Id.
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study 4 (May 2002)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study].
8. See Abt Associates, Inc., The Particulate-Related Health Benefits of Reducing
Power Plant Emissions, 6-3 to 6-4 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.cleartheair.org/
fact/mortality/mortalityabt.pdf; see also Schneider, supra note 1, at 22 (listing the
projected health costs and benefits under several proposals facing Congress).
9. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 22.
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economy. 10 The federal government is clearly complicit in allowing the
status quo, for which individual policymakers ought to be ashamed. But
more constructive is the fact that the solution is cognizable and can be
implemented in a way that solves the mutually reinforcing crises of
electricity demand, 11 infrastructural antiquation, 12 rising energy costs, 13
and soaring public and private health care expenses, 14 not to mention
going a long way toward providing the environment an overdue
respite. 15
In applying the principles of both giants of twentieth century
economic theory, demand-side and supply-side fiscal policy, 16 Congress
can cost-effectively and with minimal administrative oversight, 17 change
the course of American energy use. 18 Furthermore, it can tailor its
legislation to be compatible with existing industrial interests while
spreading the benefits of lower emissions and reduced externality costs
to the vast majority of the population. 19 The states have already set the
example. 20
10. Id. at 12 (citing findings that over three million work days every year are lost
because of the impact of power plants in the United States).
11. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 5-6 (noting that
transmission bottlenecks increase electricity costs).
12. See id. at 3 (explaining how the electricity transmission system was developed
piecemeal over 100 years by vertically integrated utilities in geographically diverse
areas).
13. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 5-6.
14. See Abt Associates, Inc., supra note 8, at 6-3 to 6-4.
15. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/
climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm [hereinafter IPCC Report] (arguing that fossil fuels
cause climate change, which in turn causes widespread environmental damage and
massive public and private insurance risks).
16. See David Storobin, American Economic Policy from 1920’s to 1990’s, Global
Politician (online magazine), May 9, 2005, http://www.globalpolitician.com/
articleshow.asp?ID=700&cid=1&sid=45 (providing a historical overview of supplyside economics).
17. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: How It
Works and Why It’s Needed (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.awea.org/pubs
/factsheets/RPSHowWhy.pdf [hereinafter RPS Overview] (explaining how regulatory
oversight of a renewable portfolio standard is minimal).
18. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Successful Strategies: Renewable Energy
Standards (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean
_energy/Climate-Solutions-RES-12-06-Update.pdf [hereinafter Successful Strategies].
19. See infra notes 442-520.
20. See Successful Strategies, supra note 18; Database of State Incentives for
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By incentivizing renewable power sources and mandating the
production, distribution, and consumption of their output, the
government can effectively make good on a public mandate for cleaner,
cheaper, more reliable energy. 21 To do this it needs to continue to
implement methodology it already employs in the form of tax credits, 22
capital financing assistance, 23 and generalized production incentives 24 —
all supply-side principles that have effectively resulted in the growth of
the renewable energy industry to this point. 25 The expansion of the
supply-side tract must be met with an equally vigorous demand-side
campaign. 26 Like a parent giving a push to a child’s sled atop a snowy
hill, Congress must simply dictate the industry’s trajectory and provide
it catalytic force to supply the direction and momentum needed to
encourage self-sustaining investment.
Part I of this Note will address some examples of the health and
environmental consequences of fossil fuels and touch on methods used
for monetizing these externalities. 27 In particular it will focus on coal-

Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy,
available at http://www.dsireusa.org (follow links to “Summary Tables” and then to
“Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy”) [hereinafter DSIRE Website] (charting
various state-offered tax incentives, rebates, grants, and loans).
21. See Lori Bird & Blair Swezey, Green Power Marketing in the United States: A
Status Report (Ninth Edition), NREL/TP-640-40904, at 26 (Nov. 2006) (analyzing the
growth of the “green power market” attributable to “demand-side stimuli”); see also
Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Windpower Outlook 2006, available at
http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/pdf/Outlook_2006.pdf [hereinafter Wind Outlook
2006] (citing a Yale public opinion poll that found that 86% of Americans favor
increased funding for renewable energy).
22. Janet L. Sawin, Worldwatch Inst., National Policy Instruments: Policy Lessons
for the Advancement & Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World
18 (Jan. 2004).
23. See Fred Beck & Eric Martinot, Renewable Energy Policies and Barriers, in
Encyclopedia of Energy (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004), available at
http://www.martinot.info/Beck_Martinot_AP.pdf (manuscript at 10-13).
24. See Renewable Energy Prod. Incentive, 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2005).
25. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 22 (listing subsidies, rebates, and net
metering rules along with tax incentives as having contributed most to the rise of
renewable energy during the 1990s and 2000s).
26. Cf. Paul Gipe, Renewable Energy Policy Mechanisms 12 (Feb. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.wind-works.org (“Subsidies alone [including “capital
investment” and tax incentives] are never a sufficient support mechanism.”).
27. See infra notes 88-93.
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based energy, the market-share leader in electricity 28 and the biggest
threat to public health and the environment. 29 As an answer to fossil
fuel hegemony, Part II will examine the progress and potential of wind
power, 30 its technological improvement, 31 receptivity to government
initiative, 32 response to investment structure, 33 and the market wind
already enjoys as exemplified in electricity consumption data. 34 Part III
will review state and federal renewable energy policies, with particular
attention to wind power, that have supply-side and demand-side
impacts. 35 Part IV addresses the technical and regulatory challenges
facing wind energy and other renewables, including transmission access
rules, 36 output variability 37 and storage techniques, 38 power grid
integration, 39 and infrastructural modernization. 40 Technical solutions
for many of these challenges offered by experts will be addressed.41
Finally, Part V will integrate examples of supply-side and demand
28. See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Coal Report 2005, DOE/EIA-0584(2005), at
8 (Oct. 2006); see also Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 100
(listing the amount of energy generated in kilowatt hours from various fossil fuel and
renewable energy sources).
29. See generally Todd L. Cherry & Jason F. Shogren, The Social Cost of Coal: A
Tale of Market Failure and Market Solution (Appalachian State Univ. Dept. of Econ.
Working Paper Series, Sept. 30, 2002) (discussing the social costs, or “externalities,” of
coal-based electricity).
30. See infra notes 102-212.
31. See Int’l Energy Agency, Long Term Research and Development Needs for
Wind Energy for the TimeFrame 2000 to 2020, at 2-4 (Oct. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Wind
Energy R&D].
32. See Energy Info. Admin., Policies to Promote Non-hydro Renewable Energy in
the United States and Selected Countries 8 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter Policies to Promote
Renewables]; Ari Reeves, Wind Energy for Electric Power: A REPP Issue Brief 20-22
(Fredric Beck ed., Renewable Energy Policy Project July 2003).
33. See Ryan Wisner & Edward Kahn, Energy & Env’t Div., Lawrence Berkeley
Nat’l Lab., Alternative Windpower Ownership Structures: Financing Terms and Project
Costs 19-21 (May 1996).
34. See infra notes 165-206.
35. See generally Gipe, supra note 26 (addressing supply-side policy theory).
36. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5.
37. Id. at 4-5.
38. See Int’l Energy Agency, Variability of Wind Power and Other Renewables:
Management Options and Strategies 27 (June 2005) [hereinafter Variability of Wind
Power].
39. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 6.
40. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 5.
41. See infra notes 365-90.
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policy initiatives into a comprehensive renewable energy policy
proposal. 42
I. THE FINANCIAL FALLACY OF FOSSIL FUELS
Electricity markets in the United States are dominated by fossil
fuels, and under current predictions, that fact is unlikely to change. 43 In
February 2007 the Energy Information Administration (the “EIA”), a
branch of the Department of Energy, released their Annual Energy
Outlook, a projection of electricity production to 2030. 44 Using current
trends, the EIA contends that fossil fuels will continue to account for the
bulk of American electricity production for the next two and half
decades. 45 Currently, 50% of domestic electricity production comes
from coal, 46 with an additional 15% from natural gas, 47 and 20% from
nuclear sources 48 —making up the overwhelming majority of the
domestic electricity market. 49 Projections bear these trends out for the
Renewable energy, by contrast—with the
foreseeable future. 50
exception of hydro power (e.g. Niagara Falls and the Hoover Dam) 51 —
has largely failed to catch on because of the high costs associated with
production and transmission, 52 variable output, 53 and the perception that
a long-term market does not exist for these energies. 54 Wind,
photovoltaic (solar), geothermal, and biomass are the leading non-hydro
sources of electricity currently available in the United States. 55
42.
43.

See infra notes 404-520.
See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 7 (graphing projected energy
consumption by fuel type and illustrating that future hydropower and non-hydro
renewables consumption comprise only a small fraction).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 14.
46. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14.
51. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.
52. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 4-5.
53. See id. at 4.
54. Cf. H. Sterling Burnett, Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Wind Power: Red Not
Green 1-2 (Feb. 23, 2004) (arguing that the tax credits and accelerated depreciation
given wind power show that wind is not yet competitive with traditional fuel sources).
55. See generally Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy Trends 2004 (Aug.
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Combined, however, they account for only about 2.5% of the nation’s
electric power sector consumption. 56 Unless the government changes
how energy production costs are reflected, the status quo ought to
endure for fossil fuels and renewables alike.
Under current federal pricing measurements, coal is the least
expensive source of electricity 57 (the EIA does not compile comparable
production price statistics for renewables, but the International Energy
Agency estimates that utility-scale wind energy costs in the United
States are close to that of natural gas in “high quality wind regimes”). 58
According to the EIA, the cost of coal at electric generating plants in
2006 averaged $1.70 in nominal dollars per million British thermal units

2005) (showing statistics highlighting these sources as the leading renewables in
producing power).
56. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35 (999 trillion Btu
out of 39,710 total in 2006).
57. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 174.
58. Int’l Energy Agency, Renewable Energy: Market and Policy Trends in IEA
Countries 656 (2004) [hereinafter Renewable Energy Report]. According to a
Renewable Energy Policy Project (REPP) analysis, “Utility-scale wind farms in the
U.S. produce wind power at a levelized cost of approximately [$0.02 to $0.06] per
kilowatt hour. . . . [W]hile the cost of energy of a particular wind project is relatively
straightforward, the comparison of the cost of wind generation to other types of
generation is often controversial,” owing to the fact that levelized cost statistics, used to
estimate wind production cost, include the “annual cost of recovering the total capital
costs plus the recurring costs such as operations and maintenance and royalty payments
divided by annual expected output.” Reeves, supra note 32, at 11. The EIA’s fossil
fuel production cost statistics are not measured on the basis of levelized cost. See id. at
12. To illustrate, the author cited a 2001 conference paper issued by Ronald L. Lehr,
John Nielsen, Steven Andrews, and Michael Milligan of the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory. Id. See Ronald L. Lehr et al., Colorado Public Utility
Commission’s Xcel Wind Decision, NREL/CP-500-30551 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windpoweringamerica/pdfs/xcel_wind_decision.pdf). The
conference paper involved a 1999 contract award decision made by the Colorado Public
Utility Commission on a “head-to-head” comparison between natural gas and wind.
The commission initially chose to give the contract to the natural gas generator based
on “low natural gas costs, low capacity value for wind, and high wind ancillary service
costs,” but reconsidered and found the wind power bid was “‘justified on purely
economic grounds’” as long as gas prices were more than $3.50 per million cubic feet
in light of the fair capacity value of the wind project (49 MW for a 162 MW project)
and the fact that “ancillary services to back up new wind power are not a major cost.”
Reeves, supra note 32, at 12. For more on levelized cost, see infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
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(“Btu”). 59 Petroleum and gas, the other fossil fuels that are used in
electricity production, do not compare with coal’s low cost. 60
Furthermore, while the cost of production of coal-based electricity has in
fact gone up considerably in the last ten years, 61 the EIA does not
project any rise between now and 2030 to be more dramatic than 0.1%
in real dollars per year. 62 Thus, there is no reason to expect the status
quo of the electricity market to change without outside action. Since
coal supplies in the United States are plentiful, 63 limiting coal-burning
will not reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. 64
The casus belli for such outside action is the fact that the
government’s pricing figures neglect to factor in the full costs of fossil
fuel production, including environmental and health costs that are not
passed onto consumers directly in their utility bill. 65 For example,
utility companies do not have to account for the consequences of
approximately six billion metric tons per year of carbon dioxide
emissions, a total that will increase to nearly eight billion metric tons per
year by 2030, a twenty-five-year increase of about 30%. 66 Nor is a
financial charge indexed to other consequences of fossil fuel burning.
Increases in the emission of sulfur, methane, carbon monoxide, nitrogen
oxides, ozone, volatile organic compounds, and other particulate matter
59.
60.

See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135.
Id. Petroleum is broken into three subcategories, residential fuel oil
($8.02/mmBtu),distillate fuel oil ($12.98/mmBtu), and petroleum coke ($1.29/mmBtu).
Id. This accounts for less than 1% of coal’s consumption. Id. at 104. Natural gas costs
$6.89 per mmBtu, up from $1.98 in 1995. Id. at 135.
61. See id. at 135. Coal’s cost per mmBtu in 1996 was $1.29, and was as low as
$1.20 per mmBtu in 2000—representing an increase of about 32% since the mid-1990s,
and 42% since the millennial turn. See id.
62. Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 174. Using 2005 dollars, this
outcome assumes a higher than anticipated economic growth—the reference case would
actually place the price $0.01 per mmBtu lower than at present. See id.
63. Richard Bonskowski & William D. Watson, Energy Info. Admin., Coal
Production in the United States—An Historical Overview 1 (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/coal_production_review.pdf.
64. Cf. id. (“The 1973 Oil Embargo renewed interest in the vast U.S. coal reserves,
as the nation strived to achieve energy independence.”) (emphasis added).
65. See John Carlin, Energy Info. Admin., Environmental Externalities in Electric
Power Markets: Acid Rain, Urban Ozone, and Climate Change xi (1995), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/pubs_html/rea/feature1.html; see also Schneider, supra
note 1 (highlighting the impact of pollution on health and mortality).
66. Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14.
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wreak havoc on human and natural habitats alike by causing things like
acid rain, urban ozone (caused primarily by nitrous oxide emissions,
resulting in respiratory problems in humans), and global climate
change. 67 Among fuels used for electricity generation, coal is by far the
largest producer of these emissions, producing far beyond its
proportional market share. 68 While coal-based power is seen to be the
least expensive source of electricity on the market today, 69 the market
dynamics that favor coal are substantially flawed. 70
The indirect costs associated with the production of electricity from
coal are simply staggering. 71 During the mining stage land is
permanently damaged, air and water sources are contaminated, ground
subsidence causes surface collapses, and workers can be injured or
killed. 72 During processing and utilization, heavy metal and acid is
given off, and particulate matter, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen oxides are emitted into the atmosphere, causing seemingly
immeasurable damage and destruction to public and private property,
wildlife, and public health. 73
Every year, the more than 600 coal-burning plants in the United
States 74 emit more than 98,000 pounds of mercury into the air 75 while
creating another 81,000 pounds of mercury pollution from fly ash and
scrubber sludge 76 , all after 20,000 pounds of mercury is released in preThat
burning “cleaning” procedures—totaling 200,000 pounds. 77
mercury, along with arsenic, cadmium, and other heavy metals, seeps
out during the coal-burning process and travels either directly through
ground water and airborne particles, or indirectly through the food chain

67.
68.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text (IPCC); Carlin, supra note 65.
See Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review 2005, DOE/EIA-0384, at
350-52 (July 2006) [hereinafter Annual Energy Review 2005].
69. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135.
70. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 4 (“[I]f the market price of coal or
energy or both does not capture the social costs of coal use, individual coal users face
incentives that suggest more consumption than society desires relative to alternative
sources of energy.”).
71. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 12-15 (revealing the mortality rates for a
number of states and linking heart attacks and lung cancer to pollution).
72. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 14.
73. Id.
74. Coal Takes Heavy Human Toll, USA Today Magazine, Oct. 16, 2004.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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(often through fish), to humans. 78 Mercury, even in small doses, is
converted easily through human metabolism into the neurotoxin
methylmercury. 79 The result of the contamination is that one out of
every six women of childbearing age may have enough of a
concentration of mercury to permanently damage a developing fetus,
meaning 630,000 babies a year born in the United States (out of 4
million) are at risk for severe neurological consequences as a result of
gestational mercury poisoning. 80 Coal also causes nearly 554,000
asthma attacks, 16,200 cases of chronic bronchitis, and 38,200 non-fatal
heart attacks each year. 81 Not surprisingly, proximity to coal-burning
facilities increases the likelihood that a person becomes one of the
23,600 deaths every year attributed to power plant pollution, 82 each
death taking an average of fourteen years off normal life expectancy.83
All told, the health care costs caused by plant emissions total an
estimated $160 billion annually. 84 Other grisly consequences from
living near coal burning include a high rate of stomach cancer, 85 autism
in children (for every 1,000 pounds of mercury released in a Texas
county, autism rates rose 17%), 86 and pneumoconiosis in coal miners
(also known as “black lung disease”). 87
Environmentally, the externality costs of air pollution, acid rain,
and global warming are also significant. 88 For instance, according to
one set of estimates, the “annual marginal cost of air pollution and acid
deposition” is between $10.39 and $11.02 per short ton of coal; for
climate change, the marginal cost is between $0 and $4.50 per million

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Schneider, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gene Weinberg et al., A Case-Control Study of Stomach Cancer in a Coal
Mining Region of Pennsylvania, 56 Cancer 703, 703 (1985).
86. See Steve Brown, Study Links Power Plant Mercury Emissions to Autism,
Education Daily, Mar., 24, 2005, at 3.
87. See Xiaorong Wang et al., Respiratory Symptoms and Pulmonary Function in
Coal Miners: Looking Into the Effects of Simple Pneumoconiosis, 35 Am. J. Indus.
Med. 124, 124 (1999).
88. See IPCC Report, supra note 15, at ch. 5 (pp. 235-343); Reeves, supra note 32,
at 15-17; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 4-7.
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Btu. 89 Absent any consideration of climate change, the approximate
“social costs of coal as a percentage of private costs range from about
40% to 275%.” 90 The range for natural gas is 12% to 95%, 112% to
123% for petroleum, and 14% to 17% for nuclear. 91 Another set of
estimates emphasizes that “coal is by far the most under-priced energy
resource,” 92 and that at a price of $30 per ton would carry with it
external costs of almost $160 without including climate change risks
which would bring costs to $190 per ton. 93 While monetizing the total
social and environmental costs to society of fossil fuel use is an inexact
science, the causal link between polluting fuels and resulting
externalities is undeniable. 94
Despite arguments and economic models that show wide-ranging
and heavy social costs to fossil fuel burning, and in particular coal
consumption, unless and until the industries themselves are compelled to
account for these costs, investment will remain high in traditional energy
sources. 95 Alternatives, still too underdeveloped as a whole to compete
with the infrastructure 96 and reliability of fossil fuels, 97 will need time
89. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 8 (citing Darwin C. Hall, Preliminary
Estimates of Cumulative Private and External Costs of Energy, Contemporary Policy
Issues Vol. VIII, No. 3, 283-307 (July1990)).
90. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 9.
91. Id. (noting that these figures are “rough estimates”).
92. Id. at 10 (citing W. Kip Viscusi et al., Environmentally Responsible Energy
Pricing,15 ENERGY J. 23 (April 1994).
93. Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 10.
94. See Schneider supra note 1, at 12-25.
95. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 6 (“By altering the underlying
incentive of prices with subsidies or taxes, relative prices can reflect society’s tradeoffs
and households and firms will voluntarily act according to society’s best interest.”);
Sawin, supra note 22, at 22 (“In most cases, it is less a matter of finding new money to
invest in renewable energy, and more a matter of transferring money flows from
conventional energy to renewables.”).
96. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 32, at 18 (explaining how wind power producers
“face significant challenges” because of the “transmission infrastructure and related
regulatory frameworks” that are in place were designed to meet the needs of traditional
energy sources, and in part because “wind is a relatively new entrant to the electricity
generation market”); see also Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-1 to A-10 (evaluating the
particular concerns facing various renewable energy sources).
97. See Bonskowski & Watson, supra note 63. As the demand for electricity has
grown, coal production has risen to meet it. Id. at 2. Productivity has increased on
average 4% every year since 1973. Id. at 7; cf. Variability of Wind Power, supra note
38, at 9 (noting that all sources of energy derive from nature and thus “vary in their
availability,” but fossil fuels have “nature cycles of regeneration which . . . occur on a
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and money to make up the difference. 98 With technological advances in
turbine design reducing the levelized cost of output, 99 and not reliant on
fossil fuel burning like biomass power, 100 wind energy has the best
chance of all truly clean energy sources to make the most immediate and
long-lasting impact on the electricity market. 101
II. A GUST OF ELECTRICITY: HOW WIND POWER IS TAKING OVER THE
WORLD AS AN INCREASINGLY VIABLE INVESTMENT OPTION AND AN
ENERGY SOURCE
With rising externality costs and significant health and
environmental consequences looming, 102 forty-nine states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico have implemented some form of incentive
for the production (supply-side) or consumption (demand-side) of
electricity from renewable energy sources. 103 Of those forty-nine states,
forty-six include incentives for wind energy, 104 the fastest growing
renewable electricity generation source in the world. 105 State wind
incentives, as for other renewables, integrate supply-side and demandside principles into a combination of both production and consumption
tax credits, grants, loans, production incentive payments, and sale and
use standards. 106 State action that comprehensively addresses energy
timescale several orders of magnitude longer” than renewables like wind, and
photovoltaic power).
98. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 26-27.
99. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 3-4.
100. Cf. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7 (explaining biomass electricity generation
strategies that would lower production costs including “cofiring biomass in existing
coal-fired power plants” and “using high-efficiency gasification with combined cycle
gas turbines”); Energy Info. Admin., Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio Standard 2
(May 2003) [hereinafter Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio] (factoring into its
examination of a federal renewable portfolio standard a 1.0 cents per kilowatt-hour
production tax credit for biomass cofiring with existing coal plants).
101. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7; Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio,
supra note 114, at 4 (finding that a renewable portfolio standard would lead to greater
generation from wind and biomass resources).
102. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 6-12, 14 (listing the “direct and
external costs” that coal-based energy levies on society).
103. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20.
104. See id.
105. Reeves, supra note 32, at 9.
106. See generally L. Bird et al., Policies and Market Factors Driving Wind Power
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distribution and consumption contributes to localized success in
encouraging the construction of wind power production facilities
(usually called “wind farms”) in nearly every region of the country. 107
In fact, because the wind-power industry has proven uniquely responsive
to government action, 108 this Note will treat wind power as the bellweather for assessing the relative effectiveness of renewable energy
legislation. The commercial promise, potential proliferation, and likely
contribution to national energy needs that wind power represents 109
requires that it be given special attention in the review of renewable
energy policy in general. 110
In February 2006, President George W. Bush voiced his ambition
that fully 20% of the nation’s electricity could come from wind, 111
mirroring results in Europe where wind accounts for a 10% to 25%
electricity market share in Denmark, Germany, and areas of Spain.112
By late 2006, installed wind-based electricity generating capacity in the
United States exceeded 10,000 megawatts. 113 Up from a 2,000
megawatt capacity in 1999, wind is the fastest growing renewable
energy source in the world, and is second to only natural gas in newly-

Development in the United States, NREL/TP-620-34599, at 1 (July 2003) [hereinafter
L. Bird et al.] (discussing the “drivers for wind development in a dozen leading states”).
107. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (listing the policies by state); Am. Wind
Energy Ass’n’s Wind Project Data Base, http://www.awea.org/projects (for a table of
installed wind energy capacity). While the Southeast—excluding Tennessee—does not
have wind energy generation facilities, other renewables benefit from local incentive
policies on the state and retailer level. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20.
108. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 8 (Figure 2 illustrates
the growth of wind capacity in the U.S. relative to the implementation of certain
government policies between 1980 and 2003); see also NREL Policies and Market
Factors, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
109. See Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Energy Markets Continue to
Boom – 2006 Another Record Year, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://awea.org/
newsroom/pdf/070202__GWEC_Global_Market_Annual_Statistics.pdf
[hereinafter
Global Wind Energy Council].
110. See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 17.
111. See Emerging U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention, Env’t News Serv.,
Feb. 22, 2006, available at www.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2006/2006-02-22-02.asp
[hereinafter U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention]
112. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy Basics, Feb. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.awea.org/newsroom/pdf/Wind_Energy_Basics.pdf
[hereinafter
Wind
Energy Basics].
113. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, U.S. Wind Energy Installations Reach New
Milestone, Aug. 14, 2006.
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installed generating capacity in the United States, as of 2005. 114
Worldwide, wind energy capacity grew 15,197 megawatts in 2006
alone, 115 accounting for nearly 75,000 megawatts total. 116 Furthermore,
busbar costs have dropped from $0.38 per kilowatt hour since
government support for wind power began in the early 1980s, to
between $0.02 and $0.06 per kilowatt hour now. 117
One megawatt hour of electricity on average in the United States
produces emissions of 1,341 pounds of carbon dioxide, 118 7.5 pounds of
sulfur dioxide, 119 and 3.55 pounds of nitrogen oxides. 120 If windgenerated electricity totaled 10 million megawatt hours per year, or
roughly the generation totals at 2002 capacity levels, 121 it would avoid
emissions of 6.7 million tons of carbon dioxide, 122 37,500 tons of sulfur
dioxide 123 (which when combined with atmospheric water vapor
becomes sulfuric acid, the primary component of acid rain), and 17,750
tons of nitrogen oxides. 124 The more wind energy that is produced in a
geographic region, the more effect it will have on displacing toxic
emissions. 125
The American wind energy market is projected by its industry trade
association, the American Wind Energy Association (the “AWEA”), to
be able to support 10,000 megawatts of wind power installations every
year. This in turn would make the goal of producing 20% of the nation’s
electrical supply achievable. 126 Considering its growth, the wind
industry is still remarkably sensitive to legislative action. 127 In fact,

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id.
See Wind Energy Basics, supra note 112.
See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109.
Reeves, supra note 32, at 9.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 99.
Reeves, supra note 32, at 15.
Id.
Id.
See id. Furthermore, “[w]ind has the potential to displace relatively more
emissions in areas where more heavily polluting fuels predominate.” Id.
126. Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 1.
127. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 36-39 for an overview of how a variety of
government policies can have a “sizeable effect on the wind industry,” especially when
transmission access is less discriminatory.
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nearly all of the industry’s major challenges are addressable through
regulatory initiative and tax policy.128 The wind power industry has
shown responsiveness to virtually every type of supply and demand-side
incentive policy on the books, including each of the following:
installation credits, net metering, system benefits funds, sales and
property tax exemptions, grants, loans, production tax credits and
incentives, and renewable portfolio standards. 129 For example, in 2003
the EIA released a study in which they examined the possible effects of
a 10% national renewable portfolio standard by 2030 130 —a lower
percentage and later date than most states currently employing a
renewable portfolio standard. 131 Wind energy, the study suggested,
would be the greatest beneficiary of such action, while fossil fuels coal
and natural gas would be most negatively influenced in terms of
production, albeit not heavily. 132 The price of electricity at end-use
sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, transportation), the EIA
found, would largely remain unaffected. 133
Furthermore, in addition to legislative incentives and marketadjustment policies, government investment into research and
development has allowed the wind industry to help itself as well. 134 The
amount of electricity that can be harvested from wind power is a
function of the mass of the moving air and its velocity. 135 Therefore
improvements in the turbine (which includes a rotor, gearbox,

128. See id. at 35-36 (finding that wind power development is promoted most
strongly by state tax and financial incentives, including renewable portfolio standards,
and technological improvements “facilitated by federal tax incentives,” but stating that
transmission costs brought about by regulatory “uncertainties” negatively affect
industry growth).
129. See L. Bird et al., supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Am. Wind
Energy Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions About Net Metering, available at
http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/netmetfin_fs.pdf (outlining some of the benefits net
metering can provide in a small-scale residential wind facility).
130. Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100.
131. See
DSIRE
Website,
supra
note
20,
available
at
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/RPS_Map.ppt.
132. See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 4, 17-18.
133. See id. at 4.
134. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4 (arguing that 40% of the reduction
in costs for wind power is a result of technological improvements, with government
polices that encourage economies of scale accounting for most of the rest); see also
Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 646 (Figure 5), 655-56.
135. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 5.
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monitoring equipment, and a tower) 136 have a direct effect on a wind
power facility’s output. 137 For example, in 1981, a standard turbine’s
rotor was 10 meters in diameter with a rated capacity of 25 kilowatts. 138
By 2000, standard rotor diameter measures 71 meters in diameter with a
capacity of 1,650 kilowatts. 139 Innovations like larger, better designed
turbines, situated in larger wind farms substantially reduce the cost of
production per kilowatt hour in large part because they are more
efficient to manage and operate. 140 As turbine capacity increases,
energy production costs go down 141 and investment goes up.142
Continued technological improvements, like those that support lower
wind speed turbine output, 143 will further support the wind market, 144
and provide power without the risk of rising fuel costs. 145

136. Id. at 8-9.
137. Id. at 5:
The energy content of a particular volume of wind is proportional to the square of its
velocity. Thus, a doubling of the speed with which this volume of air passes through
a wind turbine will result in roughly a fourfold increase in power that can be extracted
from this air. In addition, this doubling of wind speed will allow twice the volume of
air to pass through the turbine in a given amount of time, resulting in an eightfold
increase in power generated. This means that only a slight increase in wind velocity
can yield significant gains in power production.

Id.
138. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, The Economics of Wind Energy, Feb. 2005, available
at http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/EconomicsOfWind-Feb2005.pdf.
139. See id.
140. See id.; Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4.
141. Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4.
142. See, e.g., Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, News Release, Wind Energy Capacity in
U.S. Increased 27% in 2006 and is Expected to Grow an Additional 26% in 2007, Jan.
23, 2007, available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/releases/Wind_Power_
Capacity_012307.html [hereinafter Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News
Release] (citing the $4 billion aggregate investment used to install the nearly 2,500
megawatts of wind power in the United States in 2006); cf. Sawin, supra note 22, at 18
(explaining that financial incentives for renewable power industries reduce the cost of
production by subsidizing investment in new technology or in the production of the
energy itself; accordingly, increased investment is a function of lower costs for more
efficient production).
143. See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,
Wind and Hydropower Technologies Program: Low Wind Speed Technology, available
at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind_low_speed.html.
144. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 4-6.
145. See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 2.
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A. Wind Investment: Blowing Money Is a Becoming a Better Bet
Despite optimistic projections 146 and technological improvements
to the turbines that actually generate the electricity,147 both the AWEA
and the President recognize that the long-term health of the industry lies
in private investment. 148 Between 1995 and 2005, private investment in
renewables totaled roughly $180 billion, including $39 billion in 2005,
six times higher than ten years earlier. 149 Despite this growth, and the
fact that wind installations are going up faster than nuclear power plants
worldwide, 150 the structure of project ownership is crucial. 151 The
AWEA notes that because of the capital-intensive nature of wind energy
and the cheaper financing options available to utility-owned energy
projects, it is still more expensive to produce a kilowatt hour as a private
power producer than as a utility. 152 Deregulation of the electric power
sector and the rise of IOUs (investor-owned utilities) provide a safer,
potentially more lucrative option for investment. 153 IOU ownership,
according to a 1996 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study cited
by the AWEA, reduced the levelized costs of power production by as
much as 30%. 154 While product novelty may benefit certain industries
146.
147.
148.

See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News Release, supra note 142.
See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4.
See George W. Bush, “President Discusses Advanced Energy initiative In
Milwaukee,” Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 20, 2006, available at,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/print/20060220-1.html [hereinafter
Bush Speech Feb. 2006] (arguing that to “encourage conservation and new technologies
and alternative sources of energy,” the government—which provides one-third of
research and development dollars as opposed to two-thirds from the private sector—
needs to “make sure people [and private businesses] continue to invest”); see also Am.
Wind
Energy
Ass’n,
Investing
in
Wind
Power,
available
at
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/InvestingInWindPowerFS2005.pdf
(illustrating
the options open to private investors who are interested in putting money into the wind
power industry).
149. See Worldwatch Institute & Center for American Progress, American Energy:
A Renewable Path to Energy Security, at 12, Sept. 2006, available at,
http://www.nfu.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/AmericanEnergyReport.pdf.
150. Id. at 11.
151. See AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138.
152. Id.
153. See Wisner & Kahn, supra note 33, at 19-31.
154. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Comparative Cost of Wind and Other Energy
Sources. According to the AWEA, “[l]evelized costing calculates in current dollars all
capital, fuel, and operating and maintenance costs associated with the plant over its
lifetime and divides that total cost by the estimated output in [kilowatt hours] over the
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with regard to financing, wind power producers do not enjoy this
advantage. In fact, it is the opposite. 155 The AWEA notes that “lenders
therefore offer less favorable financing terms and demand a higher
return on investment than for more “conventional” energy sources.”156
Higher interest rates on capital investment, if reduced to the same level
as natural gas plants, would reduce wind energy production costs
approximately 40%. 157
Nonetheless, as wind energy grows in market share 158 —and the
European example offers support for such an eventuality 159 —novelty
wears off. From the time of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
study, wind power generation has grown exponentially. 160 In 1996, at
the study’s publication, installed capacity in the United States was
roughly 1,700 megawatts, having languished through relatively slow
growth through most of the mid-1990s. 161 Today output is far greater, 162
and industry advocates expect the economics of today’s wind industry to
attract new capital. 163 Supply-side legislation notwithstanding, potential
investors, however, need to be convinced of the long-term marketability
of the product. 164

lifetime of the plant.” Id. at n.1; see also AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138
(referencing the same study’s findings in February 2005).
155. AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138.
156. See id. (citing Wisner & Kahn, supra note 33, at 11).
157. See id. (finding that “a 50-[megawatt] wind farm delivering power at just under
5 cents per [kilowatt hour] would, if using typical natural gas financing terms, generate
electricity for 3.69 cents per [kilowatt hour]”).
158. See infra notes 165-206.
159. See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109; Am. Wind Energy Ass’n,
Global Wind Energy Market Report, March 2004 at 2-4.
160. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Power: U.S. Installed Capacity: 19812006, available at, http://www.awea.org/faq/instcap.html.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n Jan. 23, 2007 News Release, supra note 142.
164. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 6 (explaining how a lack of familiarity
with renewable technologies, coupled with premiums on acquiring investment capital—
among other barriers—result from uncertainty about future technology performance and
a generalized lack of information).
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B. “Demanding” Wind Power: A Market Analysis
To evaluate the existence of a market and its relative strength and
trajectory, in this case the wind power market, often observers point to
the relative cost of producing a unit of electricity from one source versus
other sources. 165 The federal government’s policy for promoting
renewable energy relies on supply-oriented tax credits and production
incentives in an effort to stimulate the construction of electricitygenerating facilities and the sale and distribution of renewable power.166
State policy involves more of a mix between production incentive
strategies and schemes that create markets for renewables (demandside). 167 This Note proposes that it is most accurate to determine the
existence of a power source’s market potential not by examining supply
as manifested in price, but another fundamental economic concept—
demand as expressed in consumption.
There are essentially two distinct, but related markets at work that
need to be recognized when reviewing electric power sector data. The
first is the producer-distributor market, and the second is the distributorend-user market. 168 Government, in enacting tax credits and research
165. See Burnett, supra note 54 (arguing that there is no natural market for wind
power because government subsidies artificially lower cost); see also Cherry &
Shogren, supra note 29 (asserting that the fossil fuel prevalence is a result of a market
failure which keep costs artificially low because externalities relating to health and
environmental damage caused by certain kinds of electricity production are not factored
into utility charges); but see Reeves, supra note 32, at 11. The author explains that “the
comparison of the cost of wind generation to other types of generation is often
controversial.” The controversy appears to stem from the subjective manner in which
variables like project financing or social costs are factored into these cost comparisons.
See id. For the purposes of this market analysis, social cost concerns are not imputed to
either policy-makers or investors. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5 (stating
that “investors rarely include [environmental externalities] in the bottom line used to
make decisions”).
166. See U.S. House Comm. on Energy & Com. Press Off., “Energy Policy Act of
2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” April 2005 (stating that promoting
production of renewable-sourced electricity was the purpose for renewing incentives in
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, discussed infra); see also L. Bird et al., supra note 106,
at 4-5 (providing an overview of “federal tax and financial incentives” that “encouraged
wind power development”) (emphasis added).
167. See, e.g., L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 6-35 (providing examples of statelevel policies).
168. See J.E. Pater, National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical Report, A
Framework for Evaluating the Total Value Proposition of Clean Energy Technologies,
NREL/TP-620-38597, at 6, Feb. 2006 (illustrating graphically the “value chains” which
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and development grants to fund technological improvement, seeks to
provide renewables a chance to compete with fossil fuels for access to
consumers by reducing production cost. 169 Market-creation policies like
a renewable portfolio standard affect the market primarily by mandating
that a specified threshold of electricity sales (often a percentage) come
from a particular class of energy source. 170 Electricity consumption is
the output of this cascading market system. 171 Price is thus the
economic medium through which legislative ends are met, but is not a
policy end unto itself. 172 Therefore, even though the legislation might
be aimed directly at driving down the cost of production to the power

exist in the electricity generation markets). In many circumstances, the entity that is the
distributor or transmitter of electricity is the same as the power generator (normally a
utility). See Energy Info. Admin., The Changing Structure of the Electric Power
Industry 2000: An Update, DOE/EIA-0562(00), at 16-17, 19-20, 22-24, 27-28 (2000),
available at, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf
[hereinafter Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry] (outlining the roles of
the actors in the electricity supply market). In that situation, the market (as measured
by consumption) expresses itself in the energy sources the electricity retailer (utility or
non-utility) chooses to use to generate the power it sells to its end-use customers. See
Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry, supra at 23-24 (discussing the
wholesale electricity market). For wind and geothermal energy, independent power
producers, which are “non-utilities,” generate most of the electricity that is “consumed”
(purchased) by the distributor-utilities from these sources. See Changing Structure of
the Electric Power Industry, supra at 24; Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy
Trends 2004, at 13, Aug. 2005.
169. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8 (stating, for
instance, that (1) “The United States has [used] financial incentives to try to spur the
growth of renewable energy,” and (2) research and development investments by the
government are “intended to accelerate the development and introduction of
technologies and practices that provide social benefits, such as increased energy
security, reduced energy costs, or reduced pollution associated with energy
use . . . because, when successful R&D reduces the capital and/or operating costs of
new products or processes”); see also NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 32.
170. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 8-9.
171. See Pater, supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Monthly Energy
Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 5, 143. The EIA measures geothermal, wind, and
photovoltaic electricity consumption by its net generation and employs a formula to
estimate the equivalent fossil fuel burning it would take to replace the generation from
those sources. Id.
172. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 16. “As wholesale electricity becomes
more of a competitive market commodity, price becomes relatively more important than
other factors in determining a buyer’s choice of electricity supplier.” Id.
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producer (e.g. a wind farm owner), 173 whether it creates or boosts a
market is not ascertained by looking at price per se, but in measuring
consumption and demand—the amount of energy from that source that
is actually used (producer-distributors) or purchased (distributors-end
users). 174
The double market means that demand can be measured in two
ways. In the electric power sector, consumption is measured by the
amount of power that production and distribution facilities (e.g. utilityscale power plants) use to sell to their customers. 175 This is, however,
somewhat confusing, because consumption statistics for certain
renewables, including wind, are measured by approximate thermal
conversion rates (measured in Btu), which are derived from the energy
source’s net generation (measured in kilowatt-hours). 176 This means that
figures measuring the consumption of wind energy (along with solar and
geothermal) are actually based on a formula of what a utility would have
to consume from a fossil fuel source to generate the same electricity. 177
Therefore, in evaluating demand, either the thermal conversion
equivalent of what the electric retailer consumes (in Btu) or the
electricity bought by the end-user from a retailer (in kilowatt-hours) can
be considered a result of governmental cost-reduction incentives.
The change in the wind power industry’s market share is observable
though its percentage-share of total consumption in the electric power
sector. That change can be traced to the economic impact of
governmental policy choices. 178 Owing to the fact that supply is a

173.
174.

See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 10.
Cf. Pater, supra note 168, at vi, 6 (depicting the flow of value in renewablesource electricity generation markets to illustrate how an input like a tax credit or
subsidy at one point in the “value chain” can manifest at the end).
175. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 36-37. Given the
58.6 trillion Btu of electricity the United States imported on average between 2001 and
2006, it is clear that electricity producing and distributing facilities would not generate,
or take in power they did not intend to sell. Accordingly, this Note imputes
consumption data for the electric power sector to end-use consumers of electricity. This
is reflected by the EIA’s use of “net generation” statistics for certain renewables in their
consumption data. See id. at 9, 35.
176. See id. at 164 (listing the approximate heat conversion rates for fossil fuel
plants that apply to wind power and other sources, which generated 10,022 Btu per
kilowatt-hour in 2006).
177. Id. at 164, 168.
178. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 7-8 (asserting that the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 which implemented the first production tax credit and
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function of a direct relationship between price and quantity, if the supply
curve in the producer-distributor market has been out-shifted because of
tax credits and technology subsidies, production costs would be lower
and the wind power at distributor’s disposal would correspondingly be
higher. 179 Similarly, market-creation policies like renewable portfolio
standards directly out-shift the demand curve by mandating
consumption. 180 Therefore, if the policies have any effect, demand and
consumption should be higher ex post. This Note, in keying in on
demand, posits that logically, the effectiveness of legislative policy
choices and thus, the level of investment potential, can be evaluated by
whether consumption numbers for wind energy (or any industry) are
rising at a faster rate than its peers. If wind energy consumption rates
are increasing at a faster rate over time relative to total electric power
consumption, they must be gaining a greater market share. Declining
consumption rates, or slower increases, for any other energy source
would circumstantially reinforce that conclusion.
There is no reason to suggest that the idiosyncratic desire to
purchase wind energy is a superseding intervening cause for these
results. While many utilities offer green pricing programs that allow
end-use purchasers to choose to consume electricity from renewable
sources, they accounted for only 0.2% of total U.S. electricity sales in
2005 and only about 3% of wind power consumption for that year.181
By and large this signifies that end-users buy the default energy their
utility offers, reflecting the utility’s choice and costs regarding a power
source. Moreover, since nearly all of the electricity consumed by endrenewable energy production incentive “significantly improved the economics of wind
power,” as illustrated by the growing U.S. installed wind capacity with each renewal of
the credit).
179. Cf. Reeves, supra note 32, at 22-23.
180. See N.H. van der Linden et al., Energy Research Center of the Netherlands
(ECN), Review of International Experience With Renewable Energy Obligation Support
Mechanisms 10 (ECN-C–05-025, May 2005).
181. See Bird & Swezey, supra note 21, at 4 (citing figures from Energy
Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 2005, at 46, (Nov. 2006)). It is
worth mentioning that of the 8.5 billion kilowatt hours in retail sales of electricity
attributed to voluntary purchase markets, 61% of the green power sales came from wind
energy. Id. at 26. Using the 2005 heat rate conversion factor (999 Btu per kilowatthour), that 61% would translate to 5.185 million kilowatt-hours which in turn comes out
to about 5.19 trillion Btu (2.92% of the 178 trillion Btu total for wind power in 2005).
See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35, 164.
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use sectors comes from the electric power sector, 182 that sector’s
consumption data is an accurate reflection of wind power’s electricity
demand market share.
The electric power sector consumption numbers bear out the fact
that wind power, though still a minor factor in terms of overall market
share, grew considerably faster than the electric power sector as a whole
since its statistics were first accurately recorded. 183 Total electric power
sector energy consumption (all consumption figures for this section in
trillion Btu) in 2006 was 29.4% higher than it was in 1990. 184 That
29.4% increase is the standard by which this Note evaluates the relative
growth, decline, or stagnation of selected energy sources. Coal
consumption in the electric power sector was 26.2% higher in 2006 than
it was in 1990, 185 maintaining a slightly declining majority share of the
market during that period. 186 Natural gas consumption, which is nearly
wholly reliant on the electric power sector, 187 was 92.7% higher. 188
182. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 100 (listing Electric
Power Sector statistics), accord id., at 113 (listing Electricity End Use statistics)
(showing how roughly 94% of retail electric power sector net generation is reported as
sold to end-use sectors). Losses occur mainly during transmission and distribution and
as a result of the direct use of generated electricity at “adjacent or co-located facilities.”
See Annual Energy Review 2005, supra note 68, at 224.
183. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. The data for
wind power consumption did not include independent power producers until 1989. This
analysis begins in 1990, and includes the ascertainable consumption rates during the
two years prior to the implementation of the first production tax credit, years in which
consumption was relatively stagnant. It also includes slow growth periods between
2001 and 2005 attributable to periods in which the tax credit lapsed or was threatened to
lapse. Id.
184. Id. at 35 (increasing from 30,684 trillion Btu in 1990 to 39,710 trillion Btu in
2006). The percentages have been rounded.
185. Id. at 35 (increasing from 16,261 trillion Btu to 20,517 trillion Btu).
186. Id. (53.0% in 1990, 51.7% in 2006). The electric power sector’s dependency
on coal however is mutual, as about 91% of coal’s power production in 2006 is
accounted for by this sector. See id. at 7, 35 (percentage totals rounded to nearest
tenth).
187. See id. at 7, 35. The electric power sector does not account for nearly the same
percentage of total natural gas-produced energy consumption as coal does (only 28.5%
compared with 91.0% for coal). See id. Still, while the gross consumption of energy
from natural gas for all sectors was 14.0% more in 2006 than it was in 1990 (19,730
trillion Btu to 22,495 trillion Btu) its 2006 use in the electric power sector was higher
than in 1990 by 92.7% (3,332 trillion Btu to 6,421 trillion Btu). See id. (stating that
energy consumption from natural gas in all sectors in 2006 surpassed 1990 totals by
2,765 trillion Btu); see id. at 7. The 3,089 trillion Btu difference between 1990 and
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Petroleum, the weakest of the fossil fuels in electricity production, 189 fell
49.9% in electric power sector consumption from its 1990 totals, 190
while nuclear power, neither a fossil fuel nor renewable, was 33.2%
higher. 191 Electricity production represents the major use of renewable
energy generally, 192 and the only use for wind, 193 whose market share in
the electric power sector was slightly less than 0.1% in 1990, or 29
trillion Btu. 194 In terms of vindicating government policy, however,
1990 was a proper departure point. Iowa passed the first renewable
portfolio standard in 1991, 195 and the first federal production tax credit
was passed in 1992. 196 In 1997, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Nevada
2006 in the electric power sector alone means that 111.7% of the growth in all sectors is
accounted for in electricity production. Thus, natural gas’s consumption market share
for all sectors decreased from 23.3% in 1990 to 22.6% in 2006 (-0.7%)). See id.
188. See id. at 35 (documenting an increase from 3,332 trillion Btu to 6,421 trillion
Btu, which effectively moved a 10.9% electric power sector market share in 1990 to
16.2% in 2006).
189. See id. at 35 (documenting a 4.2% market share in 1990 and a 1.6% market
share in 2006).
190. See id. (documenting 1,289 trillion Btu in 1990; 646 trillion Btu in 2006). It is
worth noting that petroleum is by far the most consumed source of energy in the
country at 40.4% for all sectors – the bulk of its use being in the transportation sector
(68.9%). See id. at 7, 33.
191. See id. at 35 (accounting for a 19.8% market share in 1990 and a 20.7% market
share in 2006).
192. See id. at 143, 146. In 2006, the equivalent of 6,523 trillion Btu was consumed
from renewable sources of energy in all sectors. Id. at 143. Of the total, 3,857 trillion
Btu was consumed by the electric power sector, good for 59.1%. Id. at 146. While
most sources of renewable energy are a product of the electric power sector in terms of
total renewables energy consumption, biomass is an exception since only 14.3% is
consumed in the production of electricity. See id. at 143, 146. Solar, though a mainstay
of renewable energy discussions, contributes to less than 1% of renewable consumption,
but most of that goes to the residential sector (92.2%), with the remaining 7.8% used in
electricity production. See id. at 143, 144. Of the other major renewable energy
sources (comprising 53.6% of the total), the electric power sector represents the
following percentage of their total consumption in all sectors: hydro: 98.9%;
geothermal: 90.2%; wind: 100%. See id. at 143, 146.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 35.
195. See Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, Pew Center on Global Climate Change 3-4 (June
2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/
race_to_the_top/index.cfm.
196. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (1992) (amended 2006).
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passed production standards as well. 197 From 1999 to 2005, eighteen
more states including Texas, California and New York, as well as the
Although wind power
District of Columbia, followed suit. 198
consumption only once actually decreased between any two years, 199
hiccups in the acceleration of wind power’s growth are widely attributed
to the lapses of the production tax credit. 200 The credit was renewed in
2005, 201 and has not lapsed since. 202 By 2006, though wind power’s
market share was still only 0.65%, it had grown in consumption from 29
trillion Btu to 258 trillion Btu, an increase of about 790%. 203 Between
1990 and 2006, electric power sector consumption, if wind were not
included, averaged an annual increase of slightly less than 1.7%. 204
Wind power consumption on the other hand—with an average annual
increase of about 46.5%—grew 26-times faster than the rest of the
field. 205 While a 20% market share is not in the picture presently, it is
clear that wind energy does enjoy a market. If access to the power grid,
which is maintained by utilities, is assured for renewable energy
producers, their input of electricity into the marketplace (both of them)
would necessarily increase. 206
The news for the wind industry is not all good. Despite recent

197.
198.
199.

Rabe, supra note 195, at 3.
Id. at 4.
See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35. The decrease
was 3 trillion Btu between 1997 and 1998. Id.
200. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 8 fig.2 (charting the
relationship between wind power’s growth in capacity and the several incarnations of
the production tax credit); Burnett, supra note 54 (arguing that the wind power industry
is beholden to the production tax credit, including a reference to the 2003 expiration in
which the author argues that wind became uncompetitive when the credit last lapsed);
Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647.
201. Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 1301 (2005).
202. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207
(2006) (extending the production tax credit to Dec. 31, 2008).
203. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Jim Caldwell, Wind in the Pipeline, Mechanical Engineering Magazine,
“Power & Energy” ¶ 15 (Mar. 2004), http://www.memagazine.org/supparch/pemar04/
pipeline/pipeline.html (arguing that “streamlined interconnection procedures and fair
transmission access and costs [to generators] would allow wind to have a place in
interstate commerce as merchant generation”). The author was the policy director for
the AWEA when he wrote this article.
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gains, long-term growth is still questionable. 207 For one, the current
production tax credit is again scheduled to expire (this time on
December 31, 2008), 208 but a tougher obstacle remains—wind power’s
greatest potential lies in relatively geographically remote regions.209
Therefore, issues involving transmission costs threaten to put the brakes
on the industry’s growth. 210 The national power grid, as it stands, is not
conducive to carrying massive amounts of current, for example, from the
wind-rich prairies of the Dakotas to larger population centers near the
Great Lakes or the Pacific Northwest. 211 As wind energy production
reaches the maximum competitive utility transmission cost, supply-side
policies will drive consumption and investment potential upward into a
veritable glass ceiling. 212
III: THE “MORAL EQUIVALENT TO WAR”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY LEGISLATION
Equating the battlefield with energy policy and the push for clean
sources of power free from foreign and despotic influences reflects the
mood of a nation weary of price shocks and embargoes when President
Jimmy Carter voiced the above analogy on April 18, 1977 during a
televised speech. 213 In fact, modern energy policy in the United States
can be traced to the oil embargoes and ensuing energy supply crises of
the 1970s. 214 A litany of bills was introduced in the Congress between
207. See id. at ¶ 2 (saying that wind energy’s “prospects” were “dimmed . . . by the
failure to secure a timely extension for the federal wind energy production tax credit” in
2004).
208. H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207 (2006).
209. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-4–A-5.
210. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 18-19 (outlining the difficulties remote wind
power producers face in trying to provide their product to consumers).
211. See Caldwell Pipeline Article, supra note 206 (explaining that the transmission
system “across the Missouri River basin or in the interior West” is “brittle” and “leads
to significant restrictions on regional electricity exports”); see Reeves, supra note 32, at
18-19.
212. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 19 (“When the demand for [access to] a
transmission path exceeds its reliable capacity, utilities react by limiting generation.”).
213. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., The President’s Proposed Energy Policy
(Apr. 18, 1977), in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLIII, No. 14, May 1, 1977, pp.
418-20, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/filmmore/ps_energy.html.
214. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, History of the
Committee, No. 100-46 (1989), available at http://energy.senate.gov/about/about_
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the Nixon and George H.W. Bush administrations, which sought to
promote energy efficiency, reduce dependence of foreign energy
sources, and incentivize their alternatives. 215 While most of the
legislation proposed during this period was aimed at stimulating
domestic energy production from fossil fuel and nuclear sources, nascent
renewable sources garnered some attention, 216 most notably solar and
geothermal technologies. 217 Over the next three decades, biomass 218 and
wind-based power 219 joined solar and geothermal technologies as the
subject of legislative policies designed to make use of inexhaustible
Whether through research and development
power supplies. 220
funding, 221 market approaches like tax credits and investment
incentives, 222 or renewable energy-based production and use
standards, 223 both the federal and state governments endeavored to fight
the energy war, often, however, on both sides of the front. 224
For the purposes of this Note, the relevant energy legislation of the
history.html.
215. See infra notes 217-28.
216. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 645-46.
217. See, e.g., Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development and
Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 95-590 (1978); Solar Energy Research Act, Pub. L. No.
93-473 (1974) (including funding for wind); Geothermal Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-410 (1974); Solar Heating and
Cooling Demonstration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-403 (1974).
218. See, e.g., Wood Residue Utilization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-554 (1980);
Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294 (1980) (regarding
extended loan commitment guarantees through 1985 in Pub. L. No. 99-24 (1985)).
219. See, e.g., Solar, Wind, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575 (1990), Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96345 (1980).
220. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 661-68 (providing a brief
overview of relevant renewables legislation between 1974 and 2005).
221. E.g., Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-345 (1980).
222. E.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981).
223. See, e.g., DSIRE Website, supra note 20, available at http://www.dsireusa.org/
documents/SummaryMaps/RPS_Map.ppt (containing an illustration of state renewable
portfolio standards).
224. See Doug Koplow & John Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel Subsidies and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal
Policy, 26 Ann. Rev. of Energy and the Env’t 361, at 362-71 (2001); see also Public
Citizen National Non-Profit Public Interest Organization, The Best Bill Corporations
Could Buy: A Summary of Industry Giveaways in the 2005 Energy Bill, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/aug2005ebsum.pdf [hereinafter Public Citizen EP
Act 2005 Analysis] (analyzing the Domenici-Barton Energy Policy Act of 2005).
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last three decades can most appropriately be deemed ‘domestic
electricity production policy.’ 225 Using fiscal policy as its tool,
legislatures use ostensibly two methods to encourage greater production
and lower prices, supply-side tax credits and subsidies and demand-side
purchase, sale, and consumption mandates. 226 In order to promote the
proliferation of renewable energy Congress has preferred to use
primarily supply-side policies, 227 with one notable exception, 228 while
many states tend toward more integrated strategies. 229
A. Making Renewables Cheaper and More Lucrative: Supply-Side
Electricity Production Policy
In order to affect the supply of a commodity—in this case
increasing renewable-source electricity production 230 —legislatures have
a number of policy options at their disposal. This Note divides them
into two categories: capital subsidization and production incentive. 231
225.
226.

Petroleum-oriented laws are not discussed at any length.
See Dr. Keith Kozloff, Hagler Bailly, Inc., Renewable Energy Strategies in
Developing and EIT Countries Under Restructured Electricity Markets, Presented at
“Accelerating Grid-Based Renewable Energy Power Generation for a Clean
Environment,” (Mar. 8, 2000), http://www.usea.org/agbrepgconf2000/pdf/b2b_s_p.pdf
(providing a breakdown of examples of supply side and demand side methods for
promoting the growth in renewable power). To avoid confusion, this Note’s use of the
term “supply-side” invokes any law that directly impacts the development and/or
installation of electricity-generating capacity through subsidy, loan, tax credit,
production incentive, rebate, or grant. Conversely, the term “demand-side” implicates
legislation designed to foster a new market or economy of scale that provides producers
of electricity with purchasers/consumers.
227. E.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 (instituting the
production tax credit and renewable energy production incentive for the first time in the
amount of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour for the production of electricity from renewable
sources).
228. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (1978), discussed infra notes 309-23.
229. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106 and accompanying text.
230. See Renewable Energy Report supra note 58, at 661-68; see also Policies to
Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8.
231. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12-13. The author refers to supply-promoting
policies of this type under the general label “subsidies,” which are divided into “capital
subsidies” (research and development and/or project financing) and “production” (tax
credit, incentive payment and rebate). Low-interest loans, while not a “subsidy” per se,
see id. at 13, still fit into this Note’s categorization as a supply-side capital subsidization
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Insofar as they pertain to the goal of stimulating renewable energy
production (supply), both act by reducing the cost of developing the
resource for market. 232 Thus, these policies directly affect the individual
commercial actor (e.g. power producer, investor, etc.), 233 and indirectly
promote broader social benefits. 234
The capital subsidization tools chosen by American jurisdictions
typically take the form of grants for research and development (R&D)
and loan programs. 235 In many states, however, rebates and investment
tax credits act as a substitute for both. 236 Each is designed to work in
tandem with the other—R&D funds improve technology while the loans
provide start-up capital to encourage the timely implementation of that
technology. 237 Likewise, rebates ensure capital recovery on investment
and installation of renewable technologies. 238 A relevant example of a
loan scheme was passed by Congress as part of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, 239 which created the “green bonds” program. In
allocating up to $2 billion in tax-exempt bond financing, large building
developers were permitted to obtain low-interest loans, the benefits of
which are allowed to be spent on renewable energy technologies for

as they are, in effect, a government-provided discount on project financing.
232. Id. at 12 (“Subsidies . . . only affect one side of the development equation:
profitability.”).
233. See id. and accompanying text; see also NREL Value Framework supra note
168, at 32-33, 40-41 (explaining how in the case of production tax credits, the firm
generating the power reaps the benefit of the policy, and in research and development
programs, the funds “may be integrated with a firm’s operations as a generator,
distributor, or an end user—although this last case is infrequent” (emphasis added)).
234. See id. The graphical representation of the value chain illustrates this principle.
Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2, at 34-35 (arguing in a
national security context vis-à-vis China that “diversifying sources and types of
energy . . . . toward alternative sources can greatly relieve pressures on markets for
conventional energy sources over time, while helping to cope with growing
environmental concerns”).
235. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (Table of Financial Incentives for
Renewable Energy), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/financial.cfm
?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=0&RE=1 for examples of how states and the federal
government employ capital subsidization policies in the areas of R&D and installation
loans.
236. Id.
237. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12-13.
238. See Pater, supra note 168, at 37-38.
239. H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 710 (2004).
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their projects. 240 Likewise, a current example of an R&D grant program
is in Florida, where the state will provide matching funds for projects
relating to renewable energy technology. 241 The purpose is to encourage
the expense of private capital on renewable energy projects in the state,
promoting renewable industry while giving Floridians the benefit of a
decreased need for local fossil fuel emissions. 242
Federal research and development funding for renewables grew
dramatically in the late 1970s, cresting $1.2 billion in the budget for
1980, before precipitously dropping off over the next decade. 243
Between 1974 and 2002, more than 10% of federal energy funding for
research and development went to renewables, totaling more than $100
billion during that time. 244 In 1974, R&D initiatives included the Solar
Energy Research Development and Demonstration Act, 245 which first
provided funds for solar and wind projects, the Geothermal Energy
Research, Development and Demonstration Act, 246 and the Solar
Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act. 247 Wind energy was the
subject of the Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, 248 which provided
grant money for research and development into the development of wind
energy technologies and was supervised by the Department of Energy
and NASA. 249
Current R&D funding is administered primarily through the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”). 250 Despite funding
240.
241.
242.

See Pater, supra note 168, at 33-34.
FLA. STAT. § 377.801 (2006).
Press Release, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, State Awards
Grants for Renewable Energy Technologies, 07-031 (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/news/2007/02/0222_01.htm (quoting Lt. Gov. Jeff
Kottkamp as saying, “Investments in cutting-edge ventures ensure a stronger economy
and a cleaner environment”). The release continues: “Through the 2006 Florida Energy
Act, the Florida Legislature appropriated $15 million for renewable energy technologies
grants to stimulate capital investment in the state and promote and enhance the
statewide utilization of renewable energy technologies . . . .” Id.
243. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 646.
244. Id. at 645-47.
245. Pub. L. No. 93-473, 88 Stat. 1431 (1974).
246. Pub. L. No. 93-410, 88 Stat. 1079 (1974).
247. Pub. L. No. 93-403, 88 Stat. 802 (1974).
248. Pub. L. No. 96-345, 94 Stat. 1139 (1980).
249. See Energy Info. Admin., Public Laws Regarding Renewables, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/legislation/publiclaw.html.
250. See http://www.nrel.gov for more information.
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woes, 251 NREL’s technological development programs received more
R&D awards than any other Department of Energy laboratory.252
Administered by the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy (“EERE”), NREL has a program for
the study and advancement of nearly all forms of renewable energy. 253
For instance, since 1980, turbine design, acoustic studies, and other
issues relating to wind power are run by the National Wind Technology
Center (“NWTC”) in Boulder, Colo., part of the DOE’s Office of Wind
and Hydropower Technologies. 254 The industry-cooperative arm of
NWTC, the Wind Partnerships for Advanced Component Technology
(“WindPACT”) has a stated objective of lowering the cost of wind
energy per kilowatt hour to 3.6 cents (not including the production tax
credit), and already claims to have contributed to its dramatic decrease
in price and corresponding rise in efficiency over the last twenty-five
years. 255
In many states, R&D financing for renewables, as well as
infrastructural modernization, grid integration, and other improvements
is covered by a “system benefits fund.” 256 The fund itself is essentially a
trust fund or a bank account whose money is appropriated to meet state
energy mandates. 257 In California, the fund is financed by placing
charges on utility companies for each unit of electricity they sell.258
Between 1998 and 2002, $540 million was generated for such projects,
with 45% going to existing facilities, 30% going to new facilities, and
the remaining money going to lower costs of renewable power for
consumers, 259 meaning the program can be shaped to meet the priorities
of the legislature that enacts it.
Just as the capital subsidization programs encourage the
improvement and construction of renewable energy facilities, the
production incentive angle of supply-side policy is concerned with

251.
252.
253.

See U.S. Renewables Grab Presidential Attention, supra note 111.
See NREL Overview, available at http://www.nrel.gov/overview.
See NREL’s Research and Technology Development, available at
http://www.nrel.gov/research.html.
254. See http://www.nrel.gov/wind/facilities.html.
255. See http://www.nrel.gov/wind/advanced_technology.html.
256. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 37. System benefits funds are also known
as a “system benefits charge” or a “public benefit fund.” Pater, supra note 168, at 37.
257. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 26-28.
258. See NREL Policies and Market Factors, supra note 106, at 8.
259. Id.
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encouraging the operation of these facilities, either through direct
incentives for capital investment or indirectly using tax credits.260
Legislation in this mould is most often associated with tax policy and
production grants. 261 In the same 2006 legislation that established their
R&D grant, 262 Florida implemented a corporate production tax credit of
$0.01 per kilowatt hour. 263 Together with the research matching grant,
Florida has sought to bridge both gaps in normal electricity production:
development capital and output. 264 Likewise, in 1978, one year after the
creation of the Department of Energy, the federal government instituted
its first production tax credit. 265
Congress passed the National Energy Act that year in part as an
effort to encourage investment in renewable energy technology, broaden
the national power grid, and allow small-scale renewable energy
producers, including wind, the right to sell their product to public utility
companies. 266 Included within was the Energy Tax Act (“ETA”). 267
The ETA provided residential energy producers income tax credits for
solar and wind-based electricity production equipment installed on the
premises: 30% of the first $2,000 and 20% for the next $8,000. 268
Similarly, the ETA authorized an additional 10% business tax credit for
investment in wind, solar, geothermal, and ocean thermal technologies
on top of the standard 10% investment tax credit, 269 which was later
260. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 12 (outlining types of policies that promote the
production of renewable-based energy via private investment and in particular
incentives that pay out to investors based on electricity generated and those that reduce
tax exposure to investors through production tax credits).
261. See id.; see also DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (Table of Financial Incentives
for Renewable Energy), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/financial.
cfm?&CurrentPageID=7&EE=0&RE=1 (providing links to the incentive policies
adopted by each state and the federal government and illustrating the prevalence of taxbased legislation and grants, loans, and rebates used to subsidize and encourage the
production of renewable energy).
262. FLA. STAT. § 377.801 (2006).
263. FLA. STAT. § 220.193 (2006).
264. See Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Florida’s Energy Plan, at
45-47 (Jan. 17, 2006).
265. See Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
266. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647-48 (providing an
explanation of the ETA and PURPA and their effects on the energy marketplace).
267. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
268. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647.
269. Id.
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repealed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 270 While Congress
extended certain business tax credits for renewables in the act, the ETA
business tax credit for wind was allowed to expire at the end of 1985. 271
During this time, however, California, the most populous state, matched
the 1978 ETA’s business investment tax credit between 1980 and
1983, 272 and soon became the leader in renewable energy production.
Until 2006, when it was surpassed by Texas, California had been the
largest wind energy producer in the country for nearly twenty-five
years. 273
By the end of the 1980s, as fossil fuel costs decreased, the only way
possible to meet the electricity production cost disparity between
renewables and fossil fuels was to go back to Congress and push for new
incentives. 274 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 275 included a $0.015 per
kilowatt hour (annually adjusted for inflation) Production Tax Credit
(“PTC”) for private or investor-owned wind, solar, geothermal, and
biomass facilities. 276 For publicly-owned utilities producing energy
from the same renewable sources, the Act instituted a $0.015 per
kilowatt hour “Renewable Energy Production Incentive” (“REPI”). 277
While the PTC was available to solar and geothermal power generators
indefinitely, wind power producers could only claim the credit for the
first ten years of operation of a qualified facility.278 As technology
improved, however, the PTC stimulated a modest growth in wind farm
construction and wind energy output and consumption, which rose from
30 trillion Btu in 1992 to 70 trillion Btu in 2001 when the initial PTC
expired. 279
After 2001, the PTC went through a series of extensions and
renewals, 280 facilitating a boom-and-bust cycle over the next five
270.
271.
272.
273.

Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
Id.
See NREL, Policies and Market Factor, supra note 106, at 7.
See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, News Release, AWEA Quarterly Market Report:
Texas Overtakes California As Top Wind Energy State, July 25, 2006, available at
http://awea.org/newsroom/releases/AWEA_Quarterly_Market_Report_072506.html.
274. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 6-8.
275. Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
276. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (1992) (amended 2006).
277. See 26 U.S.C. § 13317 (1992) (amended 2005); see also Renewable Energy
Report, supra note 58, at 648.
278. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647.
279. Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.
280. See infra notes 282-90.
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years. 281 In 2002, the PTC was extended to 2003 as part of the Job
Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, expiring December 31,
2003. 282 The following October, the PTC was again extended by the
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 283 to December 31, 2005.284
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 285 expanded the list of
qualified electricity production facilities eligible for the PTC.286
However, the Act also added a tax credit, in the amount of $5.48 per ton
produced and sold from facilities placed in operation after October 22,
2004, for the production of refined coal. 287
Thirteen years after the first PTC was authorized, Congress passed
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) and raised the credit to
$0.019 per kilowatt hour, adjusted annually for inflation, and extended it
through 2007. 288 In another alteration to the tax code, Congress applied
the “Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System,” allowing developers
who purchase solar, wind, or geothermal power-producing equipment to
claim depreciation deductions on equipment faster than they otherwise
would be allowed for such an investment. 289
Beyond the start-again-stop-again nature of the PTC, a cycle which

281. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 647 (“While the PTC was
successful when in place, the “on and off” nature of its availability was disruptive to the
steady pace of market development.”); see also L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 4 (“The
impact of the PTC on the wind energy industry is evident in the boom-bust cycle of
development in recent years.”).
282. H.R. 3090, 107th Cong. (2002).
283. H.R. 1308, 108th Cong. § 313 (2004).
284. DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (follow link to “Federal Incentives for
Renewable Energy: Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit,”), available at
http://www.dsireusa.org/library/includes/incentive2.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&Stat
e=federal&currentpageid=1&ee=0&re=1 (last visited May 27, 2007).
285. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat 1418.
286. I.R.C. § 45 (2006).
287. See Internal Revenue Service Form 8835, “Renewable Electricity, Refined
Coal, and Indian Coal Production Credit,” (2006) (illustrating not only the terms of the
refined coal credit, but how various forms of energy production incentive tax
legislation, with seemingly conflicting aims as far as the fossil fuel-renewable divide is
concerned, are each expressed on the same federal tax form).
288. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat 594.
289. I.R.C. § 48 (2006) (setting class lives at the 5-year level); see Pater, supra note
168, at 33 (indicating that the owner of this equipment could “take an additional 30%
depreciation on these items during the first year, creating an even larger incentive for
the technology”).
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EPAct 2005 continued, 290 the problem with the legislation as far as both
the renewable energy industry and its non-commercially motivated
proponents were concerned was that it, like electricity production
policies before it, also included heavy appropriations to fossil fuel-based
initiatives. 291 The Act provided a 300 million barrel expansion to the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (from 700 million barrels to 1 billion),
provided “accelerated review and approval process[es] for new refinery
facilities,” and appropriated $1.8 billion worth of funding to subsidize
costly “clean coal” facilities. 292 The funding of both renewable energy
and fossil fuels by the federal government show that Congress is most
concerned with keeping prices down for electricity rather than
promoting a particular industry over another.
Given the stark
differences between the two candidates for legislative support, Congress
seems to have disregarded fossil fuel externalities. When taking into
account the capital-intensive nature of “clean coal,” in which one of the
most promising procedures involves burning gasified coal and pumping
a mixture of the fumes under ground risking leaks and water
contamination, 293 the federal government appears to be, as the adage
goes, “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Critics cite that the only parties who
benefit from a boondoggle like this are fossil-fuel burning utilities,
mining companies, and energy lobbyists. 294
Presently, it is at the state level where the most innovative and
effective supply-side measures are pursued to promote renewable-based

290. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat 594 (setting a relatively short-term sunset for
the PTC—Dec. 31, 2007). It has since been renewed to Dec. 31, 2008 by The Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat 2922.
291. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224.
292. U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce Press Office, Energy Policy Act
of 2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, at 2 (2005).
293. See Thomas Wilson & Charles Clark, Financing Clean Coal, Public Utilities
Fortnightly, June 2005, at 73, 74-75 (explaining that the government-favored emissionsreducing technique behind “clean coal” involves burning high-grade bituminous coal,
steam, and oxygen under high pressure and mixing the resulting combustible gas with
steam and sequestering it underground; and stating further that financing such facilities
require taxpayer resources); Robert H. Socolow, Can We Bury Global Warming,
Scientific American, July 2005, at 49, 54-55 (listing the possible environmental risks to
carbon sequestration); Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 7-8 (mentioning carbon
sequestration as another externality associated with coal use).
294. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224 (pointing out that
energy corporations have spent over $100 million in campaign contributions over the
past decade).
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energy systems. 295 In New York, for example, facilities built for
photovoltaic, biomass, and wind power systems and their corresponding
equipment are all exempt from state property tax for fifteen years.296
This not only gives an incentive to utility-scale producers, but also to
small-scale, end-use consumers who can install small wind turbines or
photovoltaic panels for their own electricity needs. 297 In fact, property
tax incentives for various forms of renewable energy are available in
twenty-six states, 298 and seventeen offer some form of personal tax
deduction for renewable energy use, 299 usually for expenses incurred in
the installation of renewable energy systems like solar heating devices
for pools 300 or green energy-fueled buildings, 301 or for construction of
wind farms on ranch land. 302 By building supply from the ground up,
the end-use consumers are not only educated about the science and
benefits of renewable energy in general, they become active participants
with a commercial stake in renewable energy policy.
“Net metering” rules have similar effects as personal and property
tax exemptions and credits but act on the relationship between the
residential supplier/consumer and the utility company, rather than on the
relationship between the taxpayer and the government. 303 Forty states
and the District of Columbia have instituted some form of net
metering, 304 and Congress, as part of EPAct 2005, has since applied net
metering rules to all domestic public utility companies. 305 The standard
295. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 648 (highlighting “tax
benefits, grants, loans and loan guarantees” as among the measures “augmenting federal
policies”).
296. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax § 487(2) (2006).
297. See id. (giving no ownership restrictions in statute).
298. DSIRE Website, supra note 20.
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1083 (2006) (providing tax credit for solar
energy devices).
301. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-722 (West 2001) (providing tax credit
for green buildings).
302. See id.; but see id. at § 10-722(a)(3)(ii) (stating that the purchase costs of the
wind turbines themselves are not included in the allowable costs).
303. See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 39; Gipe, supra note 26, at 11.
304. DSIRE Website, supra note 20 (“Net Metering Rules,” available at
http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/NetMetering_Map.ppt).
305. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, State Energy
Alternatives: Net Metering, available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/alternatives/
net_metering.cfm.
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net metering scheme includes an end-use consumer who contributes to
his or her own electricity use through the use of some renewable energy
installation—like solar panels or a small wind turbine. 306 The rules
essentially require that utility companies (in some states only investorowned utilities) charge the consumer for just the net amount of
electricity the utility provides. 307 In effect, consumers are selling back
to the utility the electricity generated by their renewable energy
facilities, and utilities are charging them only for the difference between
the energy they produce and the energy they consume. 308
B. Building Markets: Demand-Side Renewable Electricity Policy
Net metering, by forcing the utility companies to purchase back the
energy produced from non-utility-owned sources, actually straddles the
line between supply- and demand-side policies. The Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act, 309 or “PURPA”, represents the operational
counterpart to net metering. The legislation, passed in 1978 as part of
the Energy Policy Act, created a category of non-utility-owned
electricity producers called “Qualifying Facilities” (“QFs”), 310 which are
smaller-sized independent renewable power producers. 311 The QFs were
given a market by PURPA in an effort to encourage renewable energy
production. 312 PURPA mandated that utilities buy the electricity output
from these outside power companies while exempting the independent
producers from the taxes and regulations associated with utility power
projects. 313 Eventually, the Solar, Wind, and Geothermal Power

306.
307.

See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 39.
Id.; see also Gipe, supra note 26, at 11 (analogizing that “net metering allows
access on the customer side of the meter”).
308. See Gipe, supra note 26, at 11.
309. Pub. L. No. 95-617 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 796 (2005).
310. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron:
Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.
J. 35, 80-81 (2005) (explaining the history and rationale for PURPA and its place in the
scheme of energy deregulation).
311. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17)(C)(ii), (18)(B)(ii) (2000).
312. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act (PURPA) (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_
energy_policies/public-utility-regulatory-policy-act-purpa.html [hereinafter
Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act].
313. See Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stoermer, The Energy Policy Act of
2005: PURPA Reform, the Amendments and Their Implications, 27 ENERGY L. J. 25,
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Production Incentives Act of 1990 314 removed the electricity output
qualifications for PURPA. 315
The QFs signed distribution contracts in the late 1970s and early
1980s with the utilities while the price of fossil fuel energy was still
relatively high. 316 PURPA, though it ended the virtual monopoly of
utility-owned power sources, 317 only required utilities to purchase the
output of independent producers at “avoided cost,” or what it would
have cost the utility to produce the energy themselves. 318 Since the vast
majority of utility-owned and operated power came from fossil fuels, 319
once the price of natural gas, coal, and petroleum decreased, the utilities
could certainly honor their contracts with the independent producers.
However, those producers were finding it increasingly difficult and
eventually impossible to meet their own production costs. 320 The price
of fossil fuels, and thus the utility’s avoided cost, simply fell farther than
Many renewable-based
renewables technology could match. 321
independent power companies, once their contracts securing favorable
prices expire, face bankruptcy. 322 Despite the legislation’s inability to
promote the long-term growth of renewables in the electric power
market, 12,000 megawatts of non-hydro renewables-based electricity
were integrated into the national power grid by 1998 as a result of
PURPA. 323
A modern approach to legislatively ensuring a renewables market
was needed. By the early 1990s, the electricity-regulatory paradigm had
shifted toward the promotion of competition inside the energy
industry. 324 The renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) emerged as an
option to sustain renewable energy’s progress in a changing electricity
30-31 (2006).
314. Pub. L. No. 101-575, 104 Stat 2834.
315. Energy Info. Admin., Public Laws Regarding Renewables, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/legislation/publiclaw.html.
316. See Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, supra note 312
317. See Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L. J. 1, 6 (2005).
318. Id.
319. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 99.
320. See Backgrounder: Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, supra note 312.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 648.
324. See Kelliher, supra note 317, at 7.
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marketplace. 325 The RPS’s flexibility is part of its strength, as it can be
implemented in a variety of ways to suit the policy ends of the
legislature. 326 The common denominator is that a quota of electricity
within a state or nation must be produced, sold, or consumed by a
specified time in the future. 327 In all, twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia have instituted some form of RPS. 328 California requires
that the state’s investor-owned utilities obtain and distribute 33% of their
power from renewable energy sources by 2020. 329 Texas, by contrast,
eschews a proportional standard and instead dictates that its renewable
energy capacity reach 5,880 megawatts by 2015. 330 Interestingly, the
development of the Texas RPS was derived in part through “deliberative
polling,” where utilities and regulators estimated the potential demand
for renewable energy through customer polling data. 331 New York has
perhaps the most ambitious RPS, mandating that a full 25% of the
state’s energy be derived from renewable sources by 2013. 332
By 2020, 40,000 megawatts of new renewable energy capacity are
projected to come online because of state standards mandating
renewable energy. 333 According to NREL, the RPS is the most effective
“policy driver” at the state level to encourage wind power
development. 334 Between 2001 and 2004, about half of the nation’s
4,300 megawatts of newly installed wind energy capacity results from
RPS policies. 335 If “set-asides” for solar energy are included, by 2020
an additional 1,000 megawatts of photovoltaic power could be

325. See Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, Renewable
Portfolio Standards: An Effective Policy to Support Clean Energy Supply 1 (Dec. 30,
2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/chp/pdf/rps_factsheet_123006.pdf (“An RPS
creates market demand for renewable and clean energy supplies.”).
326. See id. at 3-4.
327. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 7-9; Sawin, supra note 22, at 6; see also Policies
to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 19 (referencing the Dutch 1997 “Action
Programme for Renewable Energy” which “sets targets of meeting 5% and 10% of the
nation’s total energy demand with renewable sources in 2010 and 2020, respectively”).
328. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 4. The Illinois standard is not mandatory. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 11.
332. Rabe, supra note 195, at 4.
333. See Successful Strategies, supra note 18.
334. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 39.
335. See Van der Linden, supra note 180, at 45.
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contributed. 336 For example, Texas raised its RPS target of 1,280
megawatts for 2003 to 2,880 megawatts in renewable capacity by 2009
and saw 1,332 megawatts of wind power alone come online by the
middle of 2005, 337 prompting the eventual 3,000 megawatt expansion to
the RPS for 2015. 338 The EIA found that in incrementally raising the
RPS bar by 2.5% every few years until it reached 10% between 2020
and 2030, the effects would be dramatic. 339 By 2025, without a national
RPS, wind power generation is expected to be 32.0 billion kilowatthours. 340 With the 10% RPS, wind power generation rises to 140.7
billion kilowatt-hours. 341 Biomass is also projected to grow, particularly
when used in a co-firing facility. 342
New power facilities also mean new jobs. The Tennessee Valley
Authority (“TVA”), in an assessment of how it would meet a 10%
federal RPS by 2020, indicates it would need to generate a total of 19.7
billion kilowatt-hours from renewables. 343 Of that total, approximately
2.3 billion kilowatt-hours would come from wind power and 10.9 billion
from biomass. With the inclusion of solar, hydro-power, landfill gas,
and wastewater gas, the total becomes 15.25 billion kilowatt-hours
generated within the TVA’s boundaries. 344 To make up the difference,
4.45 billion kilowatt-hours of renewable energy credits would have to be
purchased. 345 The generation of that much renewable energy by the
TVA is projected to create almost 45,000 new jobs, mostly in rural areas
of the American Southeast. 346 Per 1,000 megawatt-hours of renewable
energy produced, 1.09 jobs are created on the “operating” side, whereas
1.86 new jobs are created on the investment side, with more than 3,000
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 46.
See Rabe, supra note 195, at 11.
Id. at 12 (stipulating a total of 5,880 megawatts).
See Analysis of a 10% Renewable Portfolio, supra note 100, at 10, 13
(documenting the proposed legislative targets and tabulating the corresponding
projections).
340. See id at 13.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See Jack Barkenbus et al., Resource and Employment Impact of a Renewable
Portfolio Standard in the Tennessee Valley Authority Region, at 15 (University of
Tennessee Institute for a Secure and Sustainable Environment 2006).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 30.
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jobs attributed to solar technologies and more than 23,000 jobs for wind
technologies throughout North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Tennessee,
Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi. 347
Though the RPS shifts the demand curve vis-à-vis electricity
retailers by artificially setting a market floor for what they have to
sell, 348 it naturally boosts supply for end-use consumers. 349 This effect
is so significant that the policy could easily be deemed primarily supplyside. 350 The unusual nature of the potential impact of the RPS is that
depending on how it is structured, both the demand curve (electricity
delivered to users) and the supply curve (renewable power project
construction and electricity production) can be shifted. 351 The policy
question going forward asks how the RPS can be structured to maximize
both the necessary commercial benefits to the renewable energy industry
and still ensure mitigation of the enormous costs to society attributable
to fossil fuels. 352 The best organ to ensure the equitable distribution of
renewable power while most effectively meeting the needs of the
emerging renewable power industry is Congress. 353 Despite several
attempts to do so, the federal government has yet to implement such a
standard. 354
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 31-32.
See Sawin, supra note 22, at 6.
See van der Linden et al., supra note 180, at 45-46.
See generally, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Energy-Environment Guide to
Action: Policies, Best Practices, and Action Steps for States 5-1 to 5-21 (2006)
(classifying state portfolio standards as a “supply action”).
351. See NREL Value Framework, supra note 168, at 35:
If the RPS establishes a goal that appropriately exceeds the level of existing
renewable generation in the state, the immediate benefits will accrue to the producer
of the renewable energy technology. The RPS immediately increases the demand for
renewable technologies, bringing the market a step closer to generating an economy
of scale.

Id.
352. See Rabe, supra note 195, at v (suggesting in the executive summary that
economic concerns are paramount to legislatures while environmental concerns are a
side benefit).
353. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 45 (explaining that if the country as a whole is
to realize the environmental and economic benefits of renewable energy, states and the
federal government ought to use current state policies as models on which to base future
policies; thus, to ensure comprehensive national results, Congress, as the federal
legislature, must act).
354. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Renewing America’s Economy (Jan. 2007),
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/RenewingAmericas-Economy-2005.pdf (“The U.S. Senate has passed a 10% by 2020 national
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IV. PLUGGING IN: THE TRIPLE THREAT OF TRANSMISSION COSTS,
VARIABILITY, AND GRID INTEGRATION
A. The Challenges and Some Possible Solutions
Unlike fossil fuel energy, renewable power is intermittent in nature,
wind among them. 355 Electricity can be produced from wind only when
it is blowing at a sufficient rate and in a sufficient volume, which is not
always regular and not always predictable. 356 Power grids, designed for
the constant and predictable output of fossil fuels, 357 require a reserve
capacity in order to control for outages caused by a system fault. 358 This
security standard for the overall reliability of the grid is called the “loss
of load probability”—the “probability that the load will exceed the
available generation.” 359 Power production facilities must schedule time
on the grid in advance in order to transmit electricity to the consumer. 360
A degree of uncertainty is factored into the transmission system by
integrating intermittent electricity production into a grid. 361 The grid
operator must balance the uncertain supply with the predicted demand
for power. 362 This is the point at which supply-side policy deviates from
incentivizing production and moves toward infrastructural necessities. 363
The question becomes a matter of whether the grid has the
flexibility to withstand these kinds of output fluctuations. 364 The
International Energy Agency argues that basic electrical engineering
standard three times since 2002—most recently in June 2005.”).
355. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 9.
356. Id. at 12.
357. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the
construction and development of the national power grid); Monthly Energy Review:
March 2007, supra note 6, at 99 (illustrating the relative dominance of fossil fuels in the
electric power sector since 1973).
358. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 17-18.
359. Id. at 17.
360. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 12, 19.
361. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 18-19 (explaining that the
increase in unpredictability of power supply due to intermittent sources operating on the
grid can increase the needed operational reserve capacity).
362. Id. at 17.
363. See DOE, Grid Study, supra note 7, at 8 (tying policies that encourage
economic investment to the need for “modernizing the structure and operation of the
nation’s transmission systems”).
364. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 20.
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principles suggest that enlarging and integrating the grid on a national or
international scale will control for variations. 365 Furthermore, the larger
the integrated grid becomes the less of a need exists to keep fossil fuel
generation running constantly, even at a low scale. 366 With improved
weather forecasting, geographic dispersal of wind or other renewable
energy sources can actually broaden their potential market infiltration by
reducing the reliance of the grid on one source of power. 367 In the event
that large scale climactic occurrences severely depress wind energy
output, several options exist to compensate for intermittent output. 368
Obviously the first option is the one currently used to ensure grid
security against intermittency of production—keep fossil fuel plants
online in order to compensate for potential variability. 369 The second, a
more eco-friendly option, is to implement “hydro storage facilities.” 370
Hydro storage is currently the best established and most reliable form of
electricity storage, whether in a pumped-hydro or hydro reservoir
facility. 371 Moreover, the co-joining of wind facilities and hydro plants
has been suggested as a method of facilitating the integration of wind
energy into the power grid. 372 The process involves two connected
bodies of water, one at a higher elevation, the other at a lower
elevation. 373 As with any hydro power facility, the force of the water, in
this case due to gravity, turns turbines which produce electricity. 374 In
this case, a wind farm would be attached to the hydro power facility.375
Excess power produced by the wind farm that would otherwise not go to

365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 25 (citing a study in Germany that found that “the extension of
wind power to some 36 [gigawatts] in 2015 would not require the addition of new
plants to provide operational reserve,” and a finding by the French grid operator RTE
that “short-term fluctuations of 10 [gigawatt] installed wind capacity would not exceed
100 [megawatt] within 1 minute, a figure which can be absorbed within current
dimensioning of reserves without problems”).
368. Id. at 26 (listing solutions that would control for intermittency).
369. See id. at 26-27.
370. See id. at 27 (discussing hydro-storage as one of several storage technologies).
371. Id.
372. Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 656.
373. See Gemma Allen et al., Modeling of a Wind-Pumped Hydro Scheme Within
the Irish Liberalised Electricity Market, at 2 (European Wind Energy Conference
2006), available at http://www.ucc.ie/serg/pub/ewecga.pdf.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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the grid (e.g., if it were not currently scheduled to be online), would
pump the water from the lower elevation basin to the upper. 376 During
times when the wind was insufficient to meet the grid’s electricity
demand, the hydro facility would release the stored water from the
higher-elevation facility back through the power-producing turbines. 377
In the event of a supply shortage, a hydro storage facility is capable of
replacing a traditional power station for several hours if necessary, with
a potential 1,000 megawatt capacity at the typical 80% round-trip
efficiency. 378
Another option is to interconnect and integrate contiguous grids in
an effort to further expand supply potential. 379 In Europe, where
countries are geographically smaller in scale to the United States, grid
interconnectivity between countries can act as a model to domestic
regional grid management. 380 The obstacle to efficient interconnection
in Europe is nearly identical to the one in the United States—
infrastructure. 381 The IEA estimates that by 2030, OECD countries as a
whole will need to invest $1.8 trillion for grid maintenance and upgrades
as demand grows. 382 One such strategy is the proposed “wind pipeline,”
supported by the AWEA and Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota. 383
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.
Id.
Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 27.
Id. at 29; U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 24-29 (discussing
the establishment of regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) that would
“coordinate markets and ensure the reliability of the nation’s transmission system,”
including ensuring fair wholesale energy markets).
380. See, e.g., 2006 O.J. (L 262) 1 (iterating the priorities of European
interconnection projects and policies).
381. Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 30 (explaining how there exists a
“need for further transmission grid development, including strengthening and upgrading
existing lines . . .” and that the “interconnection of grids is frequently seen as an
important step towards improved competition and full market liberalization . . . in
Europe and North America”).
382. Id.
383. See Caldwell, supra note 206; see also Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Concept
Description: Trans-Prairie and Interior West Wind ‘Pipelines’ (Sept. 6, 2003), available
at http://www.awea.org/policy/documents/WindPipeline.pdf (explaining that “each
‘pipeline’ would consist of three phases”); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Wind Power Advocate
Interview: Jay Haley, EAPC Architects Engineers (June 1, 2005),
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/windpoweringamerica/filter_detail.asp?item
id=947 (discussing Senator Dorgan’s wind conferences and “Heartland Wind Pipeline”
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The AWEA proposal, which would cost between $10 billion and $20
billion, 384 envisions a regulatory scheme that ensures a closer-tocapacity power line use with non-discriminatory access, with $1 billion
worth of local 345 kilovolt transmission lines added to the grid to avoid
“bottlenecks and bolster secondary-level reliability.” 385 This first step
would open 26,000 megawatts of wind power capacity. 386 Next, two
high-voltage lines from the northern plains, going east and west, would
be built to streamline supply to population centers on the coasts and the
industrial Midwest. Adding between 30,000 and 60,000 megawatts of
wind power capacity to the system, it would be “enough new power to
serve up to 18 million homes.” 387
The problem with improving infrastructure is that the electricity
market does not operate in a unified manner as part of one large
integrated grid, but as a community of smaller regionally managed
electricity administrators. 388 Several regional and state transmission
organizations, who determine which producers are permitted time on the
grid, have gradually instituted discriminatory pricing schemes that
essentially punish wind power generators for output variations. Their
rationale is that lower-than-expected production requires them to keep
backup generators running, regardless of whether it costs the system. 389
proposal).
384. Caldwell, supra note 206.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining in Fig. 1.1
that the North American Electricity Transmission Systems includes three interconnected
“systems,” which in turn are comprised of 140 control areas who control local
electricity operations and “coordinate reliability through 10 regional councils”).
389. See Imbalance Provisions for Intermittent Resources Assessing the State of
Wind Energy in Wholesale Energy Markets, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,349, 21,349-50 (proposed
Apr. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In this notice of proposed
rulemaking, FERC acknowledged that tariff charges levied on intermittent resources
have become outdated and have become “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory
or preferential.” Id.; see also Reeves, supra note 32, at 19 (listing the disadvantages
that wind plants in particular have faced in dealing with utilities, including the
regulatory infrastructure that was traditionally geared toward fossil fuels, fees charged
to wind power producers for the distance the electricity traveled between its production
site and the end-use consumer, charges for each transmission system through which the
electricity travels (called “rate pancaking”), and charges based on peak output, rather
than average output, which while not a major issue for fossil fuel producers, is
important to wind power producers who have large differences between the two output
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The recent granting of regulatory authority to FERC is a step toward
reigning in the disparate interests playing out on the grid. 390
B. Wind versus Utilities?
Up until now, it would appear that wind power, like any
intermittent renewable, is a veritable thorn in the side of utility
companies who maintain infrastructure, distribute, and deliver electricity
to the consumers. 391 With the advent and growth of wind power, utility
grid managers must go out of their way to adjust their scheduling
formulae to accommodate what would on paper appear to be a marginal
producer at the expense of the predictable, easy-to-manage fossil fuel
facilities. 392 Prior to FERC regulations mandating nondiscriminatory
access rules, 393 utilities could offset costs, even anticipated costs,
resulting from the impact of output variability. 394 Now, they are
required to act in a non-discriminatory fashion toward wind power
facilities. 395 However, wind power is not all bad news for the utilities. 396
Notwithstanding the fact that in certain regions wind is in fact the
low-cost option, 397 a wind energy production presence within the
purview of a utility grid manager can be a boon. 398 For instance, wind
power, like all renewables, can help offset the risks of supply shortages
in fossil fuels. 399 Additionally, since wind power can be added
incrementally, excess capacity costs are limited. 400 The inherent

numbers) (emphasis in the original).
390. See Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Aug. 8, 2006)
(explaining the agency’s new responsibilities with regard to market manipulation and
grid integration); S. Dep’t of Energy Grid Study, supra note 7, at 24-29 (referencing
FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (2000), which “calls for the formation” of the
RTOs discussed supra note 7).
391. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
392. See Variability of Wind Power, supra note 38, at 17-19.
393. See, e.g., Interconnection for Wind Energy, 111 FERC P 61,353, 2005 WL
1318317 (“F.E.R.C.”).
394. See Reeves, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
395. See 111 FERC ¶ 61,353.
396. Reeves, supra note 32, at 13.
397. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 1.
398. Reeves, supra note 32, at 13.
399. Id.
400. Id.
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disadvantage of the remoteness of wind facilities can actually be turned
into an infrastructural benefit as electricity generation outposts situated
throughout the grid can reduce the risks of voltage concentration and
overload in the production areas, thereby reducing maintenance costs.401
Furthermore, any government action on either the state or federal level
to penalize distributors for creating pollution would make a renewable
energy production facility a cost-saving asset. 402 The same is true if the
utility was faced with meeting a renewable portfolio standard that
mandated it sell a certain quantity of electricity derived from nonpolluting sources. 403
V. SAVING THE WORLD AND MAKING A BUCK AT THE SAME TIME:
ENERGY SOLUTIONS FOR AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The burgeoning renewable energy industry, its investors, 404 and the
public 405 need Congress to implement a comprehensive national energy
policy. It must integrate market-focused initiatives without losing sight
of the social reasons for promoting clean energy. This includes
programs that (1) aid renewable power producers, (2) marginalize fossil
fuels to the extent possible, and (3) set a permanent standard for
ensuring the place of renewable energy in the electricity market. This
Note proposes that the federal government can meet these ends. To do
so it must enact a scheme that incorporates elements of existing state and
national policies while adding certain unique derivations.
The first step is to ensure that current supply-side incentives will
remain into the foreseeable future. Otherwise disaster waits in the
wings. 406 In fact, during a period (January 1, 2004 to October 4, 2004)
between an earlier version of the production tax credit’s expiration and
subsequent renewal, a deceleration in the increase of new wind farm
development 407 made it clear to industry experts that the tax credits were

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Id. at 14
Id.
See Pater, supra note 168, at vi.
See Steven Clemmer et al. Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy
Blueprint, at ix-x (2001).
406. See Wind Power is a Disruptive Technology that Promotes Positive Change,
Energy Economist, Oct. 2006, at 10 [hereinafter Disruptive Technology] (explaining
how “credit lapses in the past have caused market havoc”).
407. Id.
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a necessary ingredient if long-term growth were to be assured. 408 Once
the federal tax credit was renewed, a sharp spike in wind facilities
occurred. 409 This legislative volatility has the unintended consequence
of actually raising the price of wind power while the PTC is still in
effect. For example, steel supply shortages stemming from white-hot
demand for wind power facilities 410 caused a development bottleneck
and a 30% cost increase for the turbines as projects scrambled to meet
the anticipated PTC expiration of December 31, 2007. 411 Many of the
resulting projects came in over-budget or late, setting off credit
problems for many producers. 412 If wind power’s tax credit and
production incentive, duly buffered against inflation, are assured long
lives, steady, predictable growth will follow. 413
Absent any other initiative, wind energy is competitive only when
placed on a level playing field with fossil fuels. 414 This requires the
continuation of supply-side aid. 415 The degree to which the federal
government subsidizes fossil fuel technology, 416 including the billions
408. See Caldwell, supra note 206 (referencing the blows sustained by the industry
during previous expirations of the credit, including a delay in construction of new
facilities worth a total of $3 billion after the 2001 expiration and asserting that the PTC
needs to be extended for “several years to provide a signal of stability to the investment
community”).
409. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406 (“When Congress let the credit
expire in 2004, wind development slumped, with fewer than 500 [megawatts] of new
projects installed. But when the credit was re-instated for 2005, the country added a
[then] record 2,400 [megawatts] of wind energy.”)
410. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406.
411. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong. § 207
(2006) (extending the expiration of the PTC to Dec. 31, 2008).
412. See Disruptive Technology, supra note 406.
413. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, Jan.
2007, available at http://awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Subsidy.pdf [hereinafter Wind
Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies] (referring to the need for long-term stability in
government subsidies as a key component in wind facility manufacturers’ ability to
secure more permanent investment).
414. See Burnett, supra note 54 (asserting, as a negative, that the wind power
industry is reliant on government subsidies like the production tax credit to stay
competitive).
415. See Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, supra note 413 (arguing that the
production tax credit—a supply-side initiative—is required if the wind industry, or any
energy industry, is to remain viable).
416. See Public Citizen EPAct 2005 Analysis, supra note 224 and accompanying
text; see also Reeves, supra note 32, at 21 (arguing that “because the human health and
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appropriated to coal, 417 oil, and gas 418 in the same Energy Policy Act of
2005 that extended the PTC and REPI for renewables for two more
years, belies the undeniable fact that the energy market as a whole leans
heavily on legislative aid. 419 Wind power thus is no more beholden to
Congress than any other energy source. If the mandate to reduce
dependence on foreign and polluting sources of energy is to be honored,
the PTC and REPI must be extended indefinitely. 420 The sooner they
are, the sooner the stability can be ensured for the industry, thereby
assuring a steady supply of inexhaustible energy. 421
Research and development funds must continue to be allocated
toward wind power development. The PTC, REPI, and the accelerated
depreciation plan can only be the tip of the sword however. Successful
state renewable energy plans rely on a bevy of supply-side incentives
and demand-side initiatives to stimulate wind power development. 422
Research and development grants are credited with helping to improve
turbine technology. 423 The ability to build taller towers with larger
rotors out of less costly material boosted efficiency and drove down
prices 424 to the point where wind energy in certain regions compares
favorably with fossil fuels. 425 By being able to produce more energy
from the same amount of wind input, power production facilities can
better overcome or control for unpredictable or variable output. 426
Furthermore, the federal government should continue to offer low
interest loans, or subsidize a percentage of the interest on private loans
to alleviate high capital costs up front. 427 By reducing the impact of
one-time overhead expenses, risks to investors decrease. 428 Over time as
steady power output (achieved without corresponding fuel costs)
environmental costs [of fossil fuels] are largely externalized and born by society [it
creates] a subsidy of sorts to fossil fuel burners”).
417. See id. at 5 ($9 billion).
418. See id. at 1 ($6 billion combined).
419. See U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce Press Office, “Energy
Policy Act of 2005: Highlights of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,” Apr. 2005.
420. See Wind Energy and U.S. Energy Subsidies, supra note 413.
421. Id.
422. See L. Bird et al., supra note 127 and accompanying text.
423. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-4.
424. See id. at 4-7.
425. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 1.
426. See AWEA, Wind Economics, supra note 138.
427. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 20-21
428. Id.
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compensates for initial capital outlays, 429 the long-term risk that capital
financers see in wind projects should dissipate. The government simply
needs to get the proverbial ball rolling.
Congress also needs to enact a comprehensive national electricity
distribution policy. First, renewables like wind need their rights to fair
transmission access vigorously protected by regulatory bodies like
Next, infrastructural modernization including the
FERC. 430
implementation of an integrated grid must go hand in hand with the
generalized promotion and finance of renewable-energy production
facilities. 431 A system benefits fund—a public trust fund used in many
states to pay for projects like these— 432 is the proper vehicle to provide
grid-wide renovation and upkeep, finance innovation, and even partially
compensate for fossil fuel-caused social costs.
A. The System Benefits Fund: Like Social Security but Bigger, More
Efficient, and Without the Higher Taxes or that Third Rail Problem
Financing a national system benefits fund to accomplish such a
wide range of policy objectives is ambitious, but it need not bankrupt the
Treasury. It must simply diversify its revenue streams. Often, a system
benefits fund receives its budget through consumption fees whereby
consumers pay a charge per kilowatt-hour consumed on their electricity
bill. 433 That is not necessary however. Instead, Congress should
immediately begin scaling back fossil fuel subsidies. 434 The recovered
revenue would be reallocated to form the corpus of the fund. That is not
to say that Congress should enact an economy and jobs-killing law
effective immediately, but over time, perhaps consistent with the gradual
implementation of the renewable portfolio standard discussed below,
billions of dollars in fossil fuel subsidies should be siphoned into the to
fund. Such a policy merely reflects the growing national mandate for
429.
430.

See Reeves, supra note 32, at 11.
See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that not only do unfair
transmission access pricing penalties negatively affect renewables, but that in doing so
they would compel renewable-source power generators to mitigate by “bundling” their
output with traditional power sources, thereby “reduc[ing] generator and marketer
flexibility,” which could raise prices across the board).
431. Id.
432. See supra notes 256-59.
433. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 27.
434. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22.
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renewable energy. 435 Once capitalized, the fund should be structured for
invested like a state pension fund – housed in the executive branch and
administered by a committee of representatives from existing federal
agencies like FERC, the EPA, and the Department of Health and Human
Services. Broadly defined funding priorities should be set by Congress,
while specific project prerogatives could come through the constituent
agencies and be voted on by the committee.
Any revenue mechanism plan for the fund should include a Dirty
Energy Tax on all fossil fuel energy merchants. 436 Such a tax should
increase at ever-increasing rates for power production that results in the
emission of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, particulate matter, heavy metals, and volatile organic
compounds. As for how the charge is levied, the first step is to place a
fee on the actual poundage of emissions released. 437 Just as a portfolio
standard awards credits based on kilowatt-hour sales, 438 this tax could be
partially derived from a charge on per kilowatt-hour sales of dirty
power, with a statutory limitation against passing the charge onto the
customer. The Dirty Energy Tax revenue, specifically earmarked to do
so, will provide regular income to the fund, like a commission, once
recovered subsidy revenue is no longer sufficient. Unlike Social
Security, there should be no borrowing against the national system
benefits fund; yet, like state pension funds, its capital ought to be
invested on the open market. Additionally, the proceeds of the fund
ought to be treated in a manner similar to shareholder dividends—
distributable to particular projects only when the fund as a whole meets
prescribed equity requirements—to help ensure solvency over time.
This is especially important if the national system benefits fund is to
have a wider social mandate.
As in state versions, the fund is intended to finance infrastructural
modernization, supply-side incentives for renewables, and clean
electricity generation projects. 439 A national fund, however, can have

435. See Bird & Swezey, supra note 21, at 7 (showing evidence for that mandate—a
growing number of “green power customers” in regulated and competitive energy
markets).
436. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 36.
437. See id.
438. See infra notes 472-75 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., L. Bird et al., supra note 106 (including California, id. at 8-9,
Minnesota, id. at 18, Oregon, id. at 22, Pennsylvania, id. at 30, and New York, id. at 3334).
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the means to compensate the public for the externalities it has borne due
to the market failure of pricing fossil fuel energy. Therefore, a portion
of the fund’s available assets should be set aside for environmental clean
up and conservation, 440 and to pay a percentage of the heath care costs
for those who have fallen ill as the result of unavoidable exposure to
toxic emissions. 441 In short, because of the pervasive consequences that
energy use has on society, energy policy should at least match the scope
and gravity of those effects. A fund of this magnitude and purpose can
help facilitate such mandate.
B. Bringing it All Together: The National Renewable Portfolio Standard
Two-Tiered Plan
There are essentially two ways of looking at the legislative and
regulatory policies pertaining to renewable energy in general and wind
energy in particular—the industry perspective 442 and the social
perspective. 443 The two perspectives, while not mutually exclusive, do
stem from wholly distinct motivations. An individual’s inclination
toward one view, therefore, will tend to characterize their energy policy
analysis. 444 The industry perspective is concerned primarily with energy
investors or potential energy investors looking at the policies affecting
wind power with an eye for how the commercial viability of this product
and this industry are influenced, both in the short-term and the longterm. 445 Legislation that presents a clear roadmap to industry growth
440.
441.

Administered by the EPA.
See Schneider, supra note 1, at 8 (listing the adverse health consequences
related to power plant pollution). Under this Note’s proposal, private claims would be
adjudicated at the agency level in the mould of claims made under the Social Security
Act, with the burden of proof and appeals process being the same.
442. See generally Caldwell, supra note 206 (illustrating the “wish list” the wind
power industry has vis-à-vis governmental action).
443. See generally Schneider, supra note 1 (explaining how fossil fuel power plants
are responsible for illness, death, incapacitation, deprivation of the labor force, et
cetera).
444. See, e.g., id. at 12-15, 17, 22 (evaluating several pieces of proposed and enacted
legislation on the basis of how effective they are at curbing fossil fuel power plant
pollution with respect to health effects, and the monetization thereof, and aggregate
pollutants capped).
445. See, e.g., Sawin, supra note 22 (discussing the economics of renewable energy
markets and policies used both domestically and abroad to promote the renewable
power industry).
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attracts capital, whereas no roadmap or an indiscernible, contradictory
roadmap chases capital away. 446 The social perspective is concerned
mainly with environmental, 447 health, 448 and political issues.449
Questions about the externalities of fossil fuels, 450 including wideranging topics like global warming, 451 disease, 452 and the international
balance of power are all aspects of the social perspective. 453 Legislation
that promotes the renewable energy business is all well and good here,
but only as a means to affecting an end. 454
The RPS is a tool that can act directly on any or all of the following

446.
447.
448.
449.

See id. at 26-27.
See Schneider, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 13.
See, e.g., Western Hemisphere Energy Security: Testimony Before Comm. on
Int’l Relations Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere (Mar. 6, 2006) (statement of Karen A.
Harbert, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa26334.000/hfa26334_0.HTM (stating
the strategic importance of energy policy in U.S.-Latin American relations); U.S. Dep’t
of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2, at 34-35 (discussing the relevance of
congressional energy policy adjustments in the context of global energy markets—
specifically relating to China).
450. See Schneider, supra note 1 at 12-15, 17, 22 and accompanying text (analyzing
several pieces of proposed and enacted legislation on the basis of how effective they are
in curbing fossil fuel power plant pollution with respect to health effects, and the
monetization thereof, and aggregate pollutants capped).
451. See Pater, supra note 168, at 19-20 (discussing the benefits to a company that
reduces its contribution to climate change).
452. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 8 (illustrating the significant health effects
attributed to fossil fuel power plant pollution).
453. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National Security Review, supra note 2
(studying the impacts of energy policy in the United States and China with regard to
environmental, economic, and security concerns).
454. See, e.g., Successful Strategies, supra note 18. The first line reads: “In order to
ensure healthy air and a stable climate for our children and grandchildren, we must
make responsible decisions about our energy sources. Existing technologies and
forward-thinking policies offer practical and affordable solutions o reduce our
dependence on the fossil fuels that currently dominate America’s electricity system.”
Id. The article goes on to explain, after citing the megawatt capacity increases due to
state RPSs, that renewable portfolio standards, “in addition to realizing significant
reduction of harmful emissions, the states have found that [RPSs] are an effective
means to help meet critical fuel diversity, energy security, and economic goals.” Id.
Cf. Rabe, supra note 195, at 6 (stating that in the motivation for developing an RPS,
environmental benefits “are deemed ancillary to a variety of economic advantages seen
as accruing from an RPS”).
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market entities: the power producer, retailer, or consumer. 455 The aim is
to promote renewable energy and thereby in a once-removed fashion
enable the growth of the business of renewable power production while
allowing for reductions in fossil fuel use and all that entails. 456 If
renewables become more prevalent, costs might go down, the
renewables industry could take off, the environment might improve, or
health concerns could dissipate, et cetera. 457 In short, the RPS is a catchall remedy that is increasingly seen as an energy policy panacea. 458
Given that nearly half the states have adopted some form of a
portfolio standard, it is not surprising that speculation exists regarding
the eventuality and design of a national RPS. 459 The AWEA is one such
organization seeking the enactment of a national RPS. 460 Their
proposal, not surprisingly, is perfectly suited for the long-term
commercial health and growth of renewable power producers. 461 Using
the Clean Air Act’s sulfur dioxide regulation as a model, 462 the AWEA
sets forth a plan that, while light on specific figures, completely
encapsulates the industry perspective in its underlying enforcement
mechanism. 463
If a national RPS is indeed on the horizon, a two-tiered approach
that satisfactorily accounts for both the industry and social perspectives
455. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 5 (specifying that all RPSs to date act on energy
suppliers—this Note proposes that an RPS can act on energy consumers as well if it is
structured the right way).
456. See id. at 6.
457. See, e.g., id. (explaining that one of the “biggest factors” weighing in favor of a
state’s passage of an RPS is the perception that doing so facilitates economic
development); Successful Strategies, supra note 18 (asserting that with a 20% national
RPS by 2020, carbon dioxide emissions would be halved from their currently projected
levels); Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, supra note 325 (listing
the benefits afforded by an RPS as including: environmental improvement; energy
security; lower natural gas prices; reduction in power price volatility; new jobs; and
broader local tax bases).
458. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency Combined Heat and Power P’ship, supra note
325 (illustrating the wide scope of concerns potentially addressed by an RPS).
459. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 25-26.
460. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, Factsheet, National Renewable Portfolio
Standard, available at http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdf/Federal_RPS_Factsheet.pdf.
461. See RPS Overview, supra note 17 (emphasizing the “sustainability” of the
renewable electricity industry that would be realized with the adoption of an RPS).
462. Id.; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25.
463. See RPS Overview, supra note 17; see also Pater, supra note 168, at 34.
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is warranted. 464 The AWEA proposal falls short from an industry
standpoint in that it fails to appropriately set the means by which the
standard comes to fruition. It falls short from the social standpoint in
that it fails to account for the likely concentration of the burdens of
fossil fuels in specific geographic areas. 465 An RPS—especially a
national one—in addition to the fundamental structure of any quota466
must set bars that are realistically attainable but ambitious enough to
change the energy industry in the desired way. 467 To comprehensively
meet the concerns of both perspectives, the national RPS approach will
have to account for market forces, 468 federalism, 469 and hidden energy
costs. 470 If done correctly, a balance can be wrought between each of
these.

464. This Note will use the terminology “two-tiered” to describe two distinct
federally-mandated RPSs, one of which in effect is enforced against states. This
language is not to be confused with the use of “two-tiered” discussed by other
authorities. See, e.g., Rabe, supra note 343, at 26 (discussing the issues confronting
federal and state collaboration in integrating one federal RPS with existing or future
state models, calling the arrangement alternately a “two-tier” and, more accurately, a
“multi-tier” RPS system).
465. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 14-15, 21.
466. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 5. While different from one another in their
design, RPSs that currently exist (1) stipulate a percentage or an amount of electricity to
supplied; (2) define what constitutes a “qualifying renewable electricity source;” and (3)
“over time, increases the percentage or amount of capacity or generation that must be
provided from renewable sources to meet the standard.” Id.
467. Cf. Sawin, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining that in quota systems, like the RPS,
setting the target standard and the time in which it is to be achieved is crucial—that if
the standard is too high, prices will rise “dramatically” and if it is too low, the desired
economies of scale will fail to take root).
468. See van der Linden, supra note 180, at 47-48.
469. See Rabe, supra note 195, at 25-26 (explaining the difficulties of reconciling
(a) the relationship between state policies; (b) the relationship between state and federal
policies, in particular with regard to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3).
470. See, e.g. Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 3-5 (listing the following as “cost
and pricing barriers”: “subsidies for competing fuels,” “high initial capital costs,”
“difficulty of fuel price risk assessment,” “unfavorable power pricing rules,”
“transaction costs,” and “environmental externalities”).
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C. The Industry Perspective RPS: A Business-Friendly Approach to
Revolution (in the Electricity Marketplace)
The Industry RPS must be managed as a federal regulatory
scheme. 471 Congress, after setting a production standard, would have to
pass an enabling statute that allows an agency (likely the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission) to certify and administer “renewable energy
credits.” 472 These credits represent one kilowatt hour of electricity each,
and for each power generator and distributor, the RPS determines how
many credits they must hold at the end of each fiscal year. 473 If the RPS
for a given year is 10%, each power retailer must have renewable source
energy account for 10% of their total kilowatt hour sales for the year. 474
The credits are proof of these sales. 475 The credits would be tradable
between industry actors as a parallel “commodity” to the electricity
itself. 476 The credits, while not per se indicative of sales, instead signify
that renewable energy has been supported in the amount of one kilowatt
hour per credit. 477 Thus, a non-utility-owned wind farm (a power
generator as opposed to a power retailer) 478 in North Dakota that
produces and sells only renewable energy would have 90% of that year’s
credits to sell on the open market to power producers and distributors in
any other part of the country that do not sell enough on their own. 479
Credits would not be allowed to be carried over from year to year,
and the market price would depend on how ambitious the annual
increase in the RPS would be. 480 In this way, every power retailer (like
a utility) would have to determine whether it would be more expensive

471. See van der Linden et al., supra note 180, at 51 (asserting that a “strong . . .
regulatory commitment” is needed for an RPS to be successful).
472. See Pater, supra note 168, at 36.
473. See RPS Overview, supra note 17.
474. See id. (using a 5% model); Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-6.
475. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 9.
476. See RPS Overview, supra note 17; Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25 (explaining
that the credit “could take the form of a piece of paper, like currency,” and that “[i]t
would list the number of kilowatt-hours, the year and state of origin, and the type of
generation (solar, wind, etc.)”).
477. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 24-25.
478. See id. at B-6.
479. See id. at 25 (“Since renewable generation companies produce the power, they
would be the original owners of the [credits].”).
480. See van der Linden, supra note 180, at 47.
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to produce their own renewable energy or directly subsidize the
production of it elsewhere. 481 Industry actors that fail to meet the
standard would be subjected to steep fines that substantially outpace the
fair market value of the energy credit, making the RPS effectively selfenforcing. 482 Another advantage is that unlike direct government
subsidies, no public funding is necessary. 483 Furthermore, it is effective
in both regulated and competitive wholesale energy markets. 484 The
overseeing agency would merely be required to certify the annual
ownership of the credits themselves, administer penalties for noncompliance, and adjudicate disputes over credit transactions. 485 The
formula for setting fine rates would be set statutorily along with the RPS
to avoid costly and time-consuming bureaucratic rule-making
procedures. The AWEA also notes that in an energy credit-based RPS
scheme, the market value of credits will ultimately determine when the
standard “self-sunsets.” 486 Once a credit becomes worthless, the RPS
will have accomplished its goal for at least the year. 487 To ensure longterm growth of the renewable energy industry, the RPS will have to start
high enough, accelerate fast enough, over a long enough period of time
to set off the diminishing rate of return for the credits. 488
Special attention should be given to how the target for renewable
electricity market share is set in establishing an implementation
scheme. 489 The congressional proposal of a 10% RPS by 2030
submitted to the EIA for analysis, selects the desired percentage market
share figure as the alterable variable. 490 While round numbers are easier
to understand, the quadrennial leap of first 100% (2.5% to 5%), then
50% (5% to 7.5%), and finally 33% (7.5% to 10%) does not serve the
renewables market well. 491 The RPS should grow over time, but by
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 25.
See RPS Overview, supra note 17.
See id.
See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-6 to B-7.
See RPS Overview, supra note 17.
See id.
See id.
See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4.
Id.
See EIA, 10% RPS Analysis, supra note 100, at 10 (setting a 2.5% share in first
four years renewable credits are mandated, increasing to 5% for the next four years,
7.5% for the next four years beyond that, and finally to 10% until the end of the
initiative).
491. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4.
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accelerating the standard this way, it does not provide the renewable
electricity industry the chance to develop evenly over time. 492 Rather,
this Note asserts that arbitrarily addressing only the bottom-line mandate
stresses the market. Instead the relevant variable should be renewable
electricity’s annual growth rate in market share so as to ease the standard
into the market. To be effective, the Industry RPS must give the
regulated entities time to prepare sufficient business plans and strategies
to either gather the assets needed to sell the requisite power outright or
purchase the renewable energy credits on the market. 493
The current market share of non-hydroelectric renewable electricity
in terms of consumption is roughly 2.5%. 494 According to the EIA’s
latest projections, by 2010 that market share will be 3.95% which is
where it is projected to stay with little fluctuation up to 2030. 495 The
goal of achieving a specified market share by a specified point in time is
best met through an incrementally rising RPS. 496 This Note proposes
that Congress employ either of two methods, an Accelerated Growth
Rate formula, or a market share compounded interest scheme.
The Accelerated Growth Rate (“A.G.R.”) formula begins with the
projected market share for renewables on a stipulated date, identifies an
easy-to-meet initial target, and compounds that growth rate until the
desired market share is reached. The simplest derivation is a constant
A.G.R., wherein the factor by which the annual growth rate is multiplied
stays the same throughout the life of the RPS. For illustration’s sake, a
50% constant A.G.R. RPS could begin January 1, 2010 with a base-line

492.
493.

Id.
Cf. id. at B-4. For the purposes of this discussion, qualifying electricity sources
include wind, biomass (dedicated and cofiring plants), geothermal, solar-photovoltaic,
solar-thermal, and municipal waste. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at
163. Additionally, preexisting renewables facilities will be eligible for inclusion into
the national RPS scheme and receive whatever share of renewable energy credits to
which they are entitled upon the implementation of the mandate. Id.
494. See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 35.
495. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 163.
496. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-3 to B-4. The actual numbers and market
share percentages chosen for this example are electric utility consumption numbers
(based on thermal conversion figures) and not net generation numbers (kilowatt-hours)
in order to avoid confusion about the certification of credits, which signify sales (also in
kilowatt-hours). Id. In reality, the choice of which market share figures to use are up to
legislative discretion as is the acceleration formula. Id.
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renewable market share of 3.95% in utility consumption. 497 The
alterable variable the annual growth rate—will begin at 0.01%, meaning
that by December 31, 2010, all electricity retailers must have enough
renewable energy credits to satisfy 3.96% RPS. The following year the
0.01% growth rate will increase by a factor of 50% to 0.015%, so that by
December 31, 2011 the RPS would sit at 3.98% (rounding to the nearest
hundredth). In 2012, the growth rate accelerates 50% to 0.023%,
making the RPS 4.02%. By 2015 the RPS is 4.15%, still only a 4.5%
increase over the EIA’s projections. 498 By starting small and
compounding the RPS’s annual rate of increase, the A.G.R. formula
backloads the standard and assures the market that a sufficient quantity
of renewable energy credits will be available in the beginning to achieve
total industry compliance. By 2020, the growth rate would be 0.93%,
leading to a seemingly modest 6.68% RPS, a mandate, but one that
surpasses the expected 2020 market share by more than 69%. At this
point, the acceleration begins to show results, registering RPSs of 8.08%
in 2021, 10.18% in 2022, 13.33% in 2023, 18.06% in 2024, and 25.16%
by December 31, 2025—a nearly 520% higher market share than
projected.
Setting a constant A.G.R. like 50% is the simplest method of
implementing the standard with an eye for incremental progress while
providing industry participants the chance to adapt over time to the new
market. A more complex accelerated growth rate formula can be used to
speed up or slow down the desired achievement of RPS milestones. For
instance, if in using the same 3.95%-0.01% base in 2010, the initial rate
increase is 100% for the first two years with lowering rate increases by a
factor of 10% every two years (2013 and 2014 at 90% growth increase,
2015 and 2016 at 80%, etc.), the 2015 RPS would be 4.49%, increasing
to 25.08% at 2022, roughly the same standard the 50% scheme reached,
only three years earlier.
The sun-setting of the RPS, designed to be a function of the
market, 499 kicks in at whatever percentage the statute sets as its ultimate
goal for renewable market infiltration. 500 If, for example, 25% were the
figure Congress had chosen, in the 50% constant A.G.R. formula
497.
498.

See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 138, 163.
Id. at 163. The projections referenced are based on current and expected future
consumption numbers as compiled by the Energy Information Administration. Id.
499. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-5.
500. Obviously, if renewable-based electricity accounted for 100% of power
production, the energy credits would be worthless, rendering the RPS moot.
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scenario, the acceleration would cease after 2025. In the staggered
acceleration growth rate formula, 2022 would be the end date. At that
point Congress could either elect to maintain that 25% as its final RPS,
enact a more limited growth formula, or arbitrarily set a final standard
number. Once the acceleration ends and Congress finalizes the standard,
the end game of the Industry RPS begins.
The other RPS structure that avoids the abrupt increases of the 2003
congressional proposal is one that mirrors any interest rate compounded
annually. 501 Using the initial market share as the principle (present
value), long-term RPS goal as the future value, the period over which
the compounding runs, and the rate of the annual increase, the market
share compounded interest approach provides a considerably faster start
than the A.G.R. formulae mentioned above, including a 7.28% RPS in
2015—between 60% and 70% higher than either of the two
demonstrated A.G.R. scenarios. The drawback to this approach is that it
does not provide the same slow start as the A.G.R. permutations,
potentially exposing under-prepared retailers to heavy non-compliance
penalties. By 2025, what began as a fast start for the interest
compounding formula comes in at nearly 25% three years after the
staggered A.G.R. approach and one year before the 50% constant
A.G.R.
The difference between the implementation schemes is one of
strategy and simplicity. The compounding interest formula is more
parsimonious, but the A.G.R formulae allow for a broad-based and
conservative phase-in over at least the first seven years of the RPS with
an option to ramp up the acceleration once the “getting-to-know-you”
period is over. Either structural method, however, represents an
improvement over the arbitrarily-rounded legislative targets of the 2003
proposal. 502
D. The Social Perspective RPS: Because the World Does Need Saving
Renewable energy is more than simply a business. For that reason,
this Note proposes an end-user-oriented, demand-side Social RPS to go
along with the industry version. Fossil fuels are responsible for millions
501. The formula is expressed as follows: RPS or Target Market Share = Current
Market Share (1 + annual rate of increase)^Term. For this example, a 25% RPS over a
15-year term is expressed as: 25% = 3.95% (1+ r)^15; r = 0.13 in this case.
502. See EIA, 10% RPS Analysis, supra note 100, at 10
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of dollars in health care costs, 503 a host of environmental and economic
catastrophes, 504 and even national security vulnerabilities. 505 The push
for a renewable portfolio standard given this set of concerns necessarily
requires a different mode of implementation from the business-centered
standard.
The Industry RPS, its tailored execution structure
notwithstanding, simply uses energy credits as a means to act on those
who sell power. 506 The Social RPS makes use of renewable energy
credits as well, but the relevant actors here are not utilities or
independent power producers, but American states. Through the
commodification of energy credits, even in a scheme that backloads
implementation, power retailers that lack renewable assets will more
often than those holding such assets choose to purchase credits on the
market. 507 The risk that the social costs of fossil fuel production will be
increasingly concentrated in certain regions is significant. 508 Given that
renewable energy sources have geographic restraints, their production
and distribution hubs will initially, in all likelihood, be sited at a greater
distance from end-users than their larger-market-share fossil fuel
competitors. 509

503.
504.
505.

See Schneider, supra note 1, at 22.
See generally IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148 (speaking specifically of petroleum
in this instance, the president declared America’s dependence on “unstable
governments” for energy sources a “national security issue”).
506. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at 24-25, B-4 to B-7.
507. See Pater, supra note 168, at 34. States with an RPS using renewable energy
credits form what is called a “compliance market,” the value of which was
approximated at $137 million in 2004, and is expected to rise to $608 million in 2010.
Id. This level of growth proves the existence and durability of the market, signifying as
a matter of course that these credits have buyers who are unwilling or unable to acquire
their own renewable energy assets. Id.
508. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 14-15, 21.
509. See Nogee et al., supra note 3 (including: (1) solar power, whose utility-scale
plants need 7.5 acres of mirrors for one megawatt, or one square mile for an 85
megawatt plant, id. at A-3, with deserts representing the viable siting option, id.; (2)
wind power, which is concentrated in some of the least populated areas of the country,
id. at A-4 to A-5; (3) biomass, which has no presence in the mountain west or west
coast, id. at A-7; (4) geothermal, located mainly in California and Nevada, id. at A-8;
and (5) hydro-power, which needs sufficient water flow and has significant regulatory
restrictions, id. at A-9 to A-10); see also Rabe, supra note 195, at 23 (arguing that the
biggest problem confronting Texas’s RPS is the need to construct more transmission
capacity to move wind power electricity from its collection point to higher end-use
population centers).
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The Industry RPS only acts on businesses, not individuals and not
geographic entities. 510 While the aggregate nation-wide market share of
renewables would certainly increase under this standard, its positive
social benefits like lower emissions are not evenly spread out either
geographically or throughout the population. 511 Therefore, the Social
RPS will seek to accomplish the overall reduction of fossil fuel
emissions across the board, not for the sake of the renewable energy
industry, but for the sake of health of its people and environment. To do
so, it will have to act on the states by mandating end-use consumption or
purchase rates, rather than production or sales rates. While matters
relating to the consumption of energy could constitutionally be justified
as within the realm of the Commerce Clause, 512 this Note finds that the
most effective way to avoid legal challenge 513 and ensure the successful
reduction of fossil fuel externalities is to condition certain federal
funding to the states on the timely compliance with the standard. Just as
Congress conditioned a percentage of federal highway aid for each state
on the raising of its drinking age to 21 during the 1980s, 514 Congress
would declare that it will release funding packages for highway,
education, homeland security, and all other necessary state aid only upon
the certification of the required number of renewable energy credits for
that fiscal year.
As with the Industry RPS, the Social version will be implemented
using a rate-compounding formula to ensure that state legislatures have
the opportunity to weigh their own options and adjust over time.

510.
511.

Cf. Nogee et al., supra note 3, at B-1.
See Sawin, supra note 22, at 17. An “argument against” a quota system like an
RPS is that it would “[c]oncentrate development in areas with the best resources,
causing possible opposition to projects and missing many of the benefits associated
with renewable energy (jobs, economic development in rural areas, reductions in local
pollution).” Id. (emphasis added).
512. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2007) (declaring the business
of transmitting and selling electricity “for ultimate distribution to the public” to be
“affected with the public interest,” and that the wholesale electricity market is under
Congress’s interstate commerce regulatory authority).
513. Cf. Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’
Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 507, 578 (2004) (discussing the limits and role of the
federal government in energy market regulation).
514. National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub. L. No. 98-363 § 6(a) (codified as
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2007)).
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Certainly, states could seek to carry the brunt of the purchasing and
consumption requirement on themselves through mandating renewable
energy use on government property. 515 A state could choose instead to
regulate municipal utilities, 516 enact their own RPS if they haven’t done
so already, or draft incentives for renewable energy producers to move
to their state. 517 In light of the disparate nature of states, their relative
geographic advantages, and populations, the Social RPS would
necessarily have to be a lower standard, enacted more slowly than its
commercially-oriented counterpart. States which already have their own
version of an RPS are not restricted in any way from enforcing it, as
long as the state does not drop below the mandates consumption/
purchase floor set by the federal Social RPS. 518
Like the Industry RPS, renewable energy credits would be tradable
commodities under the Social tier, but in order to marginalize the trading
so as not to defeat the purpose of ameliorating externalities, a substantial
percentage surcharge akin to a sales tax will be added to the purchase
price of each credit. A smaller surcharge will be added to the Industry
RPS, and the proceeds of both surcharges will go into the national
system benefits fund. The percentage of the fund’s non-investment
revenue attributable to these surcharges should be earmarked to fund
infrastructural projects like the “wind pipeline” that improve overall
transmission access and energy efficiency so as to broaden the
interconnectivity of the national power grid. 519 In so doing, it will help
control for output variations while directly encouraging the proliferation
of renewable power. 520

515. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 111 (2001) (requiring 20% of the energy
purchases for a building owned, leased, or operated by a state agency come from
renewable sources of energy by 2010).
516. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 19.29A.090 (2002) (requiring all utilities,
including municipal and investor-owned utilities to provide an option to consumers to
purchase electricity from “qualified alternative energy resources”).
517. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.32B (2003) (enacting a per-square-footage
tax credit for the new construction of wind turbines).
518. Cf. National Minimum Drinking Age, Pub. L. No. 98-363 § 6(a) (codified as
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2007)).
519. See Caldwell, supra note 206.
520. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Current market trends indicate that the status quo of a fossil fuelbased electricity sector is expected to endure well into this century. 521
While concerns about supply disruptions due to geopolitical worries are
more prevalent in other energy sectors, 522 the high external social and
environmental costs attributable to coal and to a lesser extent natural
gas 523 have stimulated a national discussion. 524 Despite the projections
that at current rates renewable power will remain relegated to marginalplayer status, 525 renewable energy investors have reason to be optimistic
in light of the success of green marketing programs 526 and nation-wide
growth of state incentives. 527 Also important is the fact that in the last
thirty years, awareness of global climate change, 528 the health effects of
exposure to pollution, 529 and the devastating effect toxic emissions have
on the natural world 530 has become more acute. 531 Correspondingly,
Congress and many states use the power of the purse to influence the
direction and trajectory of renewable energy progress. 532 On the federal
level, tax incentives, research grants, and low-interest loan programs are
aimed at stimulating investment in renewable energy industries. 533
States began implementing their own policies as well to encourage
renewable energy businesses to set up shop within their borders. 534
However, as policy turned to progress for renewables, the government
was still financing the polluters, 535 whose costs decreased through the

521.
522.

See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14.
Cf. id. at 70 (discussing how geopolitical instability restricts petroleum supply,
a major energy source for the transportation sector in particular).
523. See Cherry & Shogren, supra note 29, at 9.
524. See Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148.
525. See Annual Energy Outlook 2007, supra note 5, at 14.
526. See Blair & Swezey, supra note 21, at 5.
527. See DSIRE Website, supra note 20.
528. See IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
529. See Schneider, supra note 1.
530. See IPCC Report, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
531. See Policies to Promote Renewables, supra note 32, at 4.
532. See supra notes 217-332.
533. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 10 (classifying such programs as “costreduction policies” whose purpose was to provide incentives for private investment).
534. Id.
535. See Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22.
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1980s and 1990s, 536 rendering ineffectual certain pro-renewables
programs. 537
Of all the alternative energy sources, perhaps the slowest start was
had by wind. 538 Hydro power had waterfalls and dams, 539 solar power
and geothermal had immediate sources of funding, 540 and biomass could
be mixed with coal and still be considered in the same league as the
other “green” sources. 541 Nonetheless, through government-sponsored
technological development, 542 and incentivization policies, wind power
grew faster than any of its peers. 543 Innovations in turbine design544
coupled with favorable local and national policies 545 should have this
industry gaining market share as long as its production tax credit stays in
effect. 546 Furthermore, enormous growth in Europe mixed with
enormous potential in the United States indicates that wind energy is
coming of age. 547 With a viable market 548 and a history of reacting well
to government initiative, 549 the wind power industry is on the rise, 550 but
like all renewables, 551 has obstacles to overcome. 552 Transmission costs
and output variability can all be accounted for with common sense

536.
537.

See Monthly Energy Review: March 2007, supra note 6, at 135.
See Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry, supra note 168, at 51
(attributing the decline of PURPA to the ).
538. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 665, 662-663 (showing how
wind-specific programs did not come about until 1980, and how wine power capacity
did not begin to rise in earnest until the late 1990s).
539. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-9.
540. See Renewable Energy Report, supra note 58, at 661.
541. See Nogee et al., supra note 3, at A-7.
542. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-3.
543. See Reeves, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the “market for wind power
generation is rapidly expanding, due largely to decreasing technological costs and
institution of government incentives”); see also AWEA, Wind Energy Basics, supra
note 130 (indicating that in 2005 and 2006, no other renewable energy source had more
new generating capacity installed in the United States).
544. See Wind Energy R&D, supra note 31, at 2-3.
545. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 4.
546. See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 1.
547. See Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109.
548. See supra notes 165-206.
549. See L. Bird et al., supra note 106, at 39.
550. Global Wind Energy Council, supra note 109 (noting that the value of new
generating installations in 2006 alone, are worth $23 billion).
551. See Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 3-6.
552. See Caldwell, supra note 195.
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regulation, infrastructural improvements, and fair access rules, 553 but
private investment is the real key to ensuring long-term growth for
renewable power industries. 554 So too is the need to reduce or eliminate
fossil fuel subsidies 555 and demand that social costs be accounted for. 556
Indeed, this is an opportunity to win both private wealth and public
health. If the need to craft energy legislation is indeed analogous to
war, 557 then a national campaign must be undertaken using markets as a
battle plan, laws as weapons, and investors as soldiers. The barriers
addressed in this Note can be marginalized through a comprehensive
energy policy on the federal level, including a system benefits fund and
two-tiered renewable portfolio standard. 558 Furthermore, long-term
commitments to supply-side policies like tax credits and capital
assistance programs are necessary to ensure the successful cleansing of
the American energy industry. 559 In the energy war, wind power is a
battlefield where ground has been gained. When a breeze from the
direction of a power plant no longer carries toxins, but the promise of
clean electricity, victory is in the offing.

553.
554.
555.
556.

See Wind Outlook 2006, supra note 21, at 4.
Cf. Bush Speech Feb. 2006, supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Sawin, supra note 22, at 21-22.
Beck & Martinot, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining that investors will often not
take social costs into account, despite the adverse impacts fossil fuels have on health
and the environment).
557. See supra note 213.
558. See supra notes 443-520.
559. Sawin, supra note 22, at 26-27.

